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ABSTRACT 
For computer network infiltration and defense training 
within the Department of Defense, the use of Red Teams 
results in the most effective, realistic, and comprehensive 
training for network administrators. Our thesis is meant to 
mimic that highly trained adversary.  We developed a 
framework that would exist in that operational network, that 
mimics the actions of that adversary or malware, that 
creates observable behaviors, and that is fully controllable 
and configurable. 
The framework is based upon a client-server 
relationship.  The server is a Java multi-threaded server 
that issues commands to the Java client software on all of 
the hosts of the operational network.  Our thesis proved 
that commands could be sent to those clients to generate 
scanning behavior that was observable on the network, that 
the clients would generate or cease their behavior within 
five seconds of the issuance of the command, and that the 
clients would return to a failsafe state if communication 
with the command and control server was lost. 
The framework that was created can be expanded to 
control more than twenty hosts.  Furthermore, the software 
is extensible so that additional modules can be created for 
the client software to generate additional and more complex 
malware mimic behaviors. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1 
A. TRAINING NETWORK ADMINISTRATORS ....................2 
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THAT APPROACH ......................2 
C. OBJECTIVES .........................................3 
D. ORGANIZATION .......................................3 
II. BACKGROUND ..............................................5 
A. RED TEAM ...........................................5 
B. RED TEAM DURING CYBER DEFENSE EXERCISE (CDX) .......6 
C. RED TEAM DURING COMPOSITE TRAINING UNIT EXERCISE ...9 
D. A RED TEAM APPROACH USING RAD-X ...................12 
E. RED TEAM EXPERIENCE ...............................13 
F. MALWARE ...........................................13 
1. Worms ........................................14 
2. Botnets ......................................15 
3. Viruses ......................................17 
G. SUMMARY ...........................................18 
III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS ..................................19 
A. THE TRAINING OBJECTIVE ............................19 
B. THE INTERESTED PARTIES IN TRAINING ................20 
1. The Trainee ..................................20 
2. The Trainer ..................................20 
3. The Safety Observer ..........................21 
C. THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT ..........................21 
D. HOW WE CURRENTLY TRAIN ............................22 
1. Dependence on Red Teams ......................23 
2. Standardization ..............................23 
E. AN INFORMATION SYSTEM SOLUTION ....................25 
F. AN EXAMPLE TRAINING SCENARIO ......................28 
1. Pre-exercise (PRE-EX) ........................28 
2. Commencement of Exercise (COMEX) .............30 
3. Post Exercise (POSTEX) .......................32 
G. CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE ENVIRONMENT ...........33 
H. CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE TRAINER ...............34 
1. Expanded Modules .............................34 
I. CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE TRAINEE ...............35 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST PLATFORM .......................37 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................37 
B. SERVERS AND BOTS ..................................37 
1. Server Construction ..........................38 
2. Client Construction ..........................39 
3. Communication Protocol .......................41 
 viii
4. Graphical User Interface for MM-Server .......43 
C. BUILDING THE TEST PLATFORM ........................44 
D. EXPERIMENT DESIGN .................................49 
1. Operating Systems and Software Utilized ......49 
E. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT ............................52 
F. SUMMARY ...........................................54 
V. RESULTS ................................................55 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................55 
B. SETUP .............................................55 
C. TIMELINE ..........................................57 
D. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS .............................58 
1. Results for MM-Server and MM-Clients .........58 
2. Results for the Physical Servers .............61 
E. SUMMARY ...........................................68 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ............................69 
A. CONCLUSIONS .......................................69 
B. FUTURE WORK .......................................71 
1. Code Improvement and Extension ...............71 
2. More Advanced Modules ........................72 
3. Increase Scale of Test Bed ...................73 
4. Security Implications ........................74 
APPENDIX A. MM-SERVER: CANDCSERVER.JAVA ..................75 
APPENDIX B. MM-SERVER: CANDCSERVERMENUUI.JAVA ............77 
APPENDIX C. MM-SERVER: CLIENTCOMMUNICATOR.JAVA ...........83 
APPENDIX D. MM-SERVER: CLIENTCOMMUNICATORLISTENER ........87 
APPENDIX E. MM-SERVER: CLIENTDATABASE.JAVA ...............91 
APPENDIX F. MM-SERVER: CLIENTRECORD.JAVA .................97 
APPENDIX G. MM-CLIENT: CLIENTPROGRAM.JAVA ...............101 
APPENDIX H. MM-CLIENT: CLIENTCONTROLLER.JAVA ............105 
LIST OF REFERENCES .........................................111 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................113 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Proposed use case...............................28 
Figure 2. Communication protocol flow diagram.............42 
Figure 3. Physical test bed configuration.................48 
Figure 4. Virtual test bed configuration..................52 
Figure 5. Physical server IP addresses/type/names.........56 
Figure 6. Experiment Timeline of Events...................57 
Figure 7. Packet Capture between MM-Client and MM-Server..59 
Figure 8. CPU Utilization of Physical Server #1...........61 
Figure 9. CPU Utilization of Physical Server #2...........62 
Figure 10. Network Utilization of Physical Server #1.......64 
Figure 11. Network utilization of physical server #2.......65 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFB   Air Force Base 
 
CDX   Computer Defense Exercise 
COMPTUEX  Composite Training Unit Exercise 
CSTT   Combat Systems Training Team 
 
DHCP   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
DISA   Defense Information Systems Agency 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DNS   Domain Name System  
 
GUI   Graphical User Interface 
 
HTTP   Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
 
KBps   Kilobytes Per Second 
 
ICMP   Internet Control Message Protocol 
IP   Internet Protocol 
IRC   Internet Relay Chat 
 
MBps   Megabytes Per Second 
MM-Client  Malware Mimic Client 
MM-Server  Malware Mimic Command and Control Server 
 
NSA   National Security Agency 
 
 xii
RaD-X  Rapid Experience Builder  
 
TCP   Transmission Control Protocol 
 
UDP    User Datagram Protocol 
 
VM   Virtual Machine 












This thesis would not have been possible without the 
steady guidance and patience of our thesis advisor, 
Professor Singh.  Thank you for your experience and insight, 
and for the opportunity to work with you.  Our co-advisor, 
Mr. John Gibson, has his hands in so many different projects 
here at NPS, we do not know how he managed to tend them all.  
But, when we spoke with him, his attention was focused 
solely on our project even though many other projects were 
demanding this attention at the same time.  Thank you.   
From Paul: I would be remiss if I did not offer my 
thanks to the many fine faculty members here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  I have been in the computer field for 
many years, and I thought I had a good grasp of its myriad 
of topics.  After two years here at NPS, it has been made 
clear to me how little I actually knew.  I thank the many 
professors: Scott Cote, Chris Eagle, John D. Fulp, Ted 
Huffmire and so many others that have opened, stretched, and 
stuffed my mind full of so many new ideas and possibilities.  
Only at the end do I feel like I actually know something: 
that there is so much else to learn! To my good friend and 
co-partner on this thesis, Will Taff, who has been an anchor 
and a beacon to me and this project.  He kept this thesis on 
track and within proper boundaries.  He is truly a scholar 
and a gentleman. Finally, to my wife, Allie, and new 
daughter, Caitlin Mei, I thank you for keeping the household 
in order and all of the other important things in life on an 
even keel.  While I was off in cyberspace trying to make 
little ones and zeroes do my bidding, you took care of 
 xiv
things in the real world.  You are the epitome of the Navy 
wife and as always, you have my love, gratitude and 
adoration. 
From Will: everything Paul said, plus thanks to the 
fine members of not only our own cohort, but the ones up and 
down from us.  I learned as much from you guys as I did in 
the classroom, and that’s saying something.  And, to my 
thesis partner Paul: thanks for putting up with me.  You are 
not only a great academic and Naval Officer, but my kind and 
patient friend.  And lastly, to my favorite redhead and my 
rascally boys, thanks for your patience (sometimes!) and 
support (all the time).  You three continue to give meaning 




Department of Defense (DoD) use of information systems 
connected by networks continues to expand, as it arguably 
does for every enterprise level organization in the world 
today. The threats on the Internet—viruses, botnets, hackers 
and the like—form the basis for enormous vulnerability, both 
to the machines of the networks, and to the Department of 
Defense mission that those machines support: protecting the 
security of the United States of America. 
Network administrators perform a vital role in both 
administering and protecting our networks.  They carry out 
the myriad tasks essential to the function of the network, 
ranging from the routine to the tremendously complex—
configuring the host machines, the network hardware, the 
firewalls, interfacing with the system users—the list 
continues ad infinitum.  Network administrators form the 
bulwark of our defense, which is referred to as “Information 
Assurance.”   
The traditionally accepted “threat equation” states 
that risk is equal to threats multiplied by vulnerabilities—
mitigated only by safeguards [1].  Since the safeguards of 
DoD networks, indeed any network, is most fundamentally 
influenced by the skill of its administrators, the primary 
mitigation of risk to DoD networks (indeed the DoD on the 
whole and ipso facto, the security of the entire nation) 
rests on the quality of training provided to our network 
administrators.  When we consider that the threat to our 
networks are ever increasing, as is our usage of them and 
the concomitant increase in vulnerability, it becomes that 
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much more imperative that we provide the best and most 
effective training possible to our network administrators.   
A. TRAINING NETWORK ADMINISTRATORS 
DoD training of its network administrators relies on a 
wide variety of different methods.  Classroom instruction is 
standard, as are mentors performing on-the-job training.  
Instructed laboratory environments are also commonplace.  
Still, the most significant training of DoD network 
administrators in the area of information assurance is 
performed by the use of red teams.  These red teams are 
composed of highly-trained, specifically-tasked personnel 
that act as adversaries in order to test the networks and 
their administrators by emulating the threats that the 
administrators currently face. 
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THAT APPROACH 
While classroom training of network administrators is 
essential, it is often considered unsatisfactory for the 
sorts of robust evaluations required in the military 
environment.  Laboratory training can be more robust, but 
the training does not evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of the actual network of the organization.  The red team 
approach is superior in both these areas; the training is 
both robust, and often performed on the operational network 
of the organization.  Still, the DoD red teams that perform 
this training are not an unlimited asset.  They consist of 
personnel with specialized training requirements, limited 
funding and operational tempo, etc.  Reliance on red teams, 
thus, restricts the amount of training available to DoD  
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network administrators.  This in turn impacts DoD networks 
on the whole, and is therefore a matter of national 
security.   
C. OBJECTIVES 
Our objective is to design a network training tool to 
help train administrators—one that can integrate the network 
evaluation into the highly complex training events typical 
of U.S. military training exercises.  Towards this, we seek 
to construct a system with the following characteristics: 
• The system must be safe enough for use on the 
operational network, and not constrained for use 
in the laboratory.  Towards this, it must be 
inherently benign, externally controllable, and 
include a tested failsafe condition for rapid 
neutralization and/or retraction (rollback) from 
the impacted network. 
• The system must emulate threat behaviors rather 
than duplicating the threats themselves, i.e., the 
system must be constructed of malware mimics, not 
actual malware. 
• The system must be distributed, allowing the 
trainer to be geographically distinct from the 
network and the network administrators undergoing 
training.  
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides a brief treatment of the motivation 
for this thesis: mainly, the defense of the United States 
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through improved training for the administrators of DoD 
networks.  This goal we propose achieving through the use of 
a distributed software system.  
Chapter II gives a more formal definition of red teams, 
as well as usage examples of red teams in DoD environment.  
Chapter II also gives a brief overview of the current 
threats to networks and enumerates some of their behaviors.   
Chapter III covers the design considerations of our 
proposed software solution.  We formally define the 
interested parties in training, as well as the training 
objective, and give an example of how the proposed system 
could be used in an actual training exercise.  We give 
further treatment of our stakeholders in training, and 
specifics on what behaviors might be desired that a software 
solution perform. 
Chapter IV has discussion of the actual software 
implementation of the system, to include the Graphical User 
Interface (GUI).  It also discusses the complex test-bed on 
which we tested our implementation.   
Chapter V presents results from our testing of the 
system, to include graphical representation of system 
performance.  It shows that the software system we have 
implemented does indeed generate externally observable 
network behaviors that are remotely controllable.   
Chapter VI is the summary of the thesis, with 
conclusions regarding the outcome.  It also enumerates 
future work that could be done on this project, to include 
some of the areas that will require more refinement before 
the system is ready for a production environment.   
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter gives more specific treatment of red teams 
used in a DoD setting, to include employment.  Additionally, 
some of the threat signatures and behaviors used by red 
teams are discussed, to include bots, worms, and viruses.   
A. RED TEAM 
Red teams are “specially selected groups designed to 
anticipate and simulate the decision-making and behaviors of 
potential adversaries.” [2] The red team forces an 
organization to examine itself critically.  No organization 
is perfect, no weapon system is perfect, and no idea is 
perfect.  The red team examines whatever it is that needs to 
be evaluated, uncovers its flaws, and finds potential 
weaknesses that can be exploited.  Sun Tzu said, “If you 
know your enemy and know yourself you need not fear the 
results of a hundred battles.” [3]  Complete knowledge of 
the enemy may be impossible, but through the use of red 
teams, a more thorough knowledge can definitely be gained 
about one’s own organization.   
Red teams are used in all aspects of military planning.  
They are used at the tactical level in mock battles using 
infantry, mechanized, and/or aerial units acting as a real, 
opposing, red force.  The two-week, high intensity, Red Flag 
training exercise held at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), 
Nevada (on occasion at Eielson AFB, Alaska) was created to 
simulate realistic combat missions against a credible and 
live opposing force.  Red teams, typically led by staff 
Intelligence Officers, are used in staff planning of future 
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maneuvers to foresee possible reactions or resultant 
movements of the enemy.  They are utilized in the creation 
of new weapons or new national or military guidance 
publications, such as the National Security Strategy, Joint 
Strategy Review, and the Maritime Strategy.  One example was 
the led by the Naval War College.  Most notably, the Global 
War Games from 1984-1988 resulted in many significant 
conclusions that helped to define the Maritime Strategy at 
that time [4]. By having red team think tanks and war gaming 
scenarios, the actions of forecasted adversaries can be 
identified.  This information could then sway the future 
actions of the entire DoD. 
From the aspect of cyber-security, red teams are vital 
in the training of the government and military network 
operators.  The term operators can be as broad as the entire 
staff, which will include managers and officers, 
administrators, engineers, help desk, and response 
technicians.  The term operators in this thesis will limit 
its scope to the administrators, help desk personnel, and 
technicians. 
B. RED TEAM DURING CYBER DEFENSE EXERCISE (CDX)   
One of the two red team examples will come from the 
annual Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX) that is held between the 
United States Service Academies, other military academic 
schools (Air Force Institute of Technology and Naval 
Postgraduate School), and on occasion, other nations’ 
military schools (e.g., in 2010, the Royal Military College 
of Canada was part of the competition). The tenth annual CDX 
sponsored by the National Security Agency (NSA) was in 2010 
[5]. 
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In the CDX, it is each school’s mission to design a 
network from scratch, build it in its entirety, fortify it 
and then defend it for an entire week against external and 
internal attack.  The network must meet a certain baseline 
such as providing a Web service, domain name service, active 
directory, e-mail, bulletin board, and more.  The students 
must research what are the most effective and secure 
operating systems to use.  Then, the applications and 
services must be identified, installed, and properly 
configured.  These computers and services must then be 
joined to a network which is then linked into the entire 
game network via a Virtual Private Network connection which 
logically removes the game network from the rest of the 
internet.  The NSA red team is situated in its own network 
with access to the entire game network where it can launch 
attacks against all of the competing schools.  In the 2010 
competition, the red team had an agent on the inside of each 
school’s network, along with a cluster of five improperly 
configured computers. The agent, acting the part of the 
“ignorant user” could be persuaded to visit malicious 
websites and click on dubious e-mail attachments.   
Getting the entire exercise network researched, built, 
and operational takes a great deal of effort by students.  
Further efforts are required to harden the computers, 
operating systems, services, and the entire network.  
Getting the entire network operational is merely the ante to 
compete in the CDX.  For the participants, the real work and 
concomitant training value comes from the competition week 
when the NSA red team begins their attacks. 
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 As delineated in the Certified Ethical Hacking Manual, 
there are five phases in which an intruder advances the 
attack [6].  The red team followed these typical five 
phases: reconnaissance, scanning, gaining access, 
maintaining access, and covering their tracks.  Some steps 
were shortened (reconnaissance, since some information is 
already known) or skipped (covering of tracks, since the 
students need to identify what was compromised).  This is 
done so that the students of the competing schools can 
experience what it is like to be scanned, infiltrated, and 
exploited.  The detection of the infiltration or the 
witnessing of unintended actions must be noticed, steps 
taken to neutralize the problem, corrective actions taken to 
restore impacted systems, and further research and steps 
taken to prevent that problem from happening again.  The red 
team would do their best to infiltrate as many systems as 
possible and leave their mark for the schools to find. 
 The red team was limited in what they were allowed to 
use in their attacks.  Common hacking software suites, e.g., 
Backtrack and Metasploit, were utilized along with a host of 
other easily available tools that anyone with access to 
hacker sites on the internet could obtain.  Current exploits 
and vulnerabilities could also be used if they were present 
on the networks.  This encouraged the competing schools to 
review the current literature and download and install the 
current applicable patches for their systems.  The red teams 
were not allowed to generate their own malicious code or 
exploits. 
 The red team presented a live, thinking opponent to all 
of the competing schools.  Automated tools and other 
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software were utilized, but the red team members took the 
data that was returned and formulated strategies of what to 
attack next.  The intelligent enemy could probe further, 
find out what is installed, and run attacks against known 
vulnerabilities of the running software or installed 
operating systems.  Furthermore, the inside red team agent 
was another vector of attack.  These two facets taught the 
students to look for attacks from outside and within, how to 
effectively place and use sensors, to research and 
constantly update their systems, and if anything was 
breached, how to investigate, limit the extent of the 
damage, and restore the system to operation with the 
vulnerability removed. 
 The only negative aspect of this exercise is that it is 
done on an exercise network.  As mentioned previously, the 
point of the exercise is to build and defend a network.  
Therefore, all of the decisions were made with security as 
the top priority.  This is not true for every organization 
and every network.  Having this exercise done on a true, 
operational network, with all of the requirements and needs 
of the user-base met, and with hundreds or thousands of 
constant users, would make this exercise even more 
realistic. 
C. RED TEAM DURING COMPOSITE TRAINING UNIT EXERCISE 
An example of an exercise that does use the operational 
network is the Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX). 
It is the culminating exercise for the qualification of a 
strike group.  A strike group of usually five to seven ships 
spends nearly a year in the predeployment workup cycle and 
upon successful conclusion of COMPTUEX, the battle group is 
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assessed to determine its readiness for deployment and for 
battle. The COMPTUEX is an intense exercise that is 
developed to stress the entire group: the staff, the ship’s 
officers, the ship’s crew, the Marines, (if embarked), the 
joint component, and the Air Wing, to name a few. 
COMPTUEX is the time when the onboard computer networks 
are attacked by the red team from the Navy Cyber Defense 
Operational Center.  As previously mentioned, COMPTUEX is 
the final exercise for the strike group.  The cyber attacks 
are only a small portion of all the attacks that will be 
directed toward these ships.  The ships have multiple 
objectives to complete every day.  Some events are specific 
to one ship, others to some subset or all of the ships.  
These events affect every person onboard.  With the increase 
in workload, the computer networks, communication systems, 
and combat systems are heavily utilized to accomplish the 
many missions set forth by the examiners.  It is during this 
tumultuous time that the red team also attacks these vital 
networks. 
All of the events of COMPTUEX are scripted by the 
evaluators at the Center for Surface Force Training Atlantic 
or Tactical Training Group Pacific.  Since they are scripted 
and all actions must be graded, there are breaks given so 
that vital systems or groups that must be graded will have 
the tools normally available to them to accomplish their 
task.  Therefore, the red team will not usually target vital 
systems during the war-fighting phases of the training.  The 
red team will usually attack during the quieter times of the 
whole exercise. This is difficult for the network 
administrators and technicians: following manning their 
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battle stations during simulated combat operations, they 
must then man their normal shipboard watch stations and 
continue defending from attacks by the red team.  
Purposefully, some of the attacks on the computer networks 
and communication systems are linked to the battle.  There 
are specific training objectives designed to take down vital 
communication channels during attacks or evolutions so that 
the ships and watch teams can be evaluated on their 
response. This is to allow the assessment of such questions 
as: “Can the ship fight without their normal complement of 
communication options?”   
In this context, the red team of COMPTUEX performs 
similar functions to the red team of the CDX.  The red team 
attempts to scan the system, breach it, and then exploit it.  
Since this training is done on an operational network, 
certain behaviors are desired without the exact malware 
being introduced to the network.  Therefore, the red team 
simulates the effects of some of the more nefarious attacks.  
The mission of the red team is to test the vigilance of the 
network administrators, technicians and, to an extent, the 
users of that network.  Some of the attacks are only 
detectable by the administrators, and then only by reviewing 
the logs of the firewall, intrusion detection systems, and 
other sensors and services.  Some of the attacks the users 
will see in malicious emails, odd things happening on their 
work computers, or even strange printouts on networked 
printers.  The attacks are varied and thorough, testing all 
equipment, sensors, and people. 
By having a red team attack an operational network, the 
training and evaluation are much more realistic.  The actual 
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network administrators, technicians, help desk, and users 
are tested on the computers and equipment they use every 
day.  This is the environment with which they are most 
comfortable.  More importantly, these are the networks that 
will be used prior to and during the battle.  Upon 
completion of the associated training and evaluations, the 
IT professionals on the ship now know the strengths and 
weaknesses of their own network.  They know how to use their 
sensors and know what the sensors can and cannot reveal.  
Also, they may find that their network has some derived 
vulnerabilities due to the other systems with which it must 
interface.  These are the residual risks that exist within 
all organizations.  
The major downside to the training is that the full 
repertoire of attacks may not have been used because it is 
an operational network.  The risk of corrupting or 
destroying the operational network could cripple the ship 
for days, weeks, or more depending on the attack. Such cases 
would be detrimental to the strike group readiness, likely 
preventing the on-time deployment of the strike group 
(COMPTUEX is usually immediately prior to the end of the 
workup cycle).  Therefore, attacks of such intensity must 
either be avoided or simulated to some extent.  The red team 
may not use them, but a true adversary would likely have no 
restrictions on what is or is not allowed. 
D. A RED TEAM APPROACH USING RAD-X 
An example of an interesting approach using red-team 
methodologies is the Defense Information Systems Agency’s 
(DISA) use of the Rapid Experience Builder (RaD-X) training 
tool.  RaD-X is essentially a portable network training 
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laboratory, isolated from the operational network and the 
Internet, allowing for its use as a “sandbox” for network 
administrator students to observe network exploits as they 
occur.  With this tool, users can observe many of the 
threats discussed below—worms, botnets, viruses and the 
like—by use and analysis of intrusion detection and 
intrusion prevention systems organic to the system.  RaD-X 
includes instructional courseware and formal laboratory 
exercises that complement the training the students receive 
while utilizing the laboratory network.  Though portable, 
the footprint is significant: the system includes a large 
number of laptop computers and concomitant network hardware, 
as it is a self-contained training network [7].     
E. RED TEAM EXPERIENCE 
Exercises verses a red team is the pinnacle of a unit’s 
training.  It is utilized in the capstone evaluation of this 
country’s deploying forces. The red team provides training 
that is as realistic as possible.  It can produce an 
experience like no other.   
As mentioned in the previous sections, the red team can 
attack from a multitude of vectors. Only a small subset of 
the attacks that the red team utilizes will be examined. The 
attacks that are examined are some of the most dangerous and 
disruptive to network security today. 
F. MALWARE 
A computer is a tool that executes instructions, or 
programs, at a very rapid pace.  For the most part, a benign 
program does productive work, safely interacting with the 
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components of computer, such as the processor, the files on 
the hard drive, and other processes and data in memory.  
Malicious programs perform work or actions that the user 
does not want and ends with results that are insulting, 
frustrating, and/or damaging.  Spam e-mail fits into all of 
those categories.  Virus logic bombs that destroy critical 
files are incredibly damaging.  Denial of Service attacks on 
e-commerce sites can be frustrating for the customer and 
potentially damaging for the business, normally resulting in 
lost business and revenue. Root-kits that allow unauthorized 
access to other people’s or organization’s computer 
resources are a significant security risk, and usually 
causing some form of loss or damage. 
“Malware” is the overarching term used to describe the 
programs that force the computer to execute these 
misbehaving tasks.  The types of malware that will be 
considered herein are: worms, botnets and viruses. 
1. Worms 
A worm is stand-alone malicious code that propagates 
across the hosts of a network, with or without human 
assistance—no interaction on the part of a user is required.  
According to Gu (et al.), there are three characteristics of 
an Internet worm: 
• Internet worms generate a substantial volume of 
identical or similar traffic.  This can be 
detected by passive listening on the network, as 
performed by protocol analyzers like Wireshark or 
Intrusion Detection Systems like Snort.   
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• They use random scanning to probe for vulnerable 
hosts, which can also be detected by those passive 
listeners. 
• Compromised hosts exhibit predictable signatures: 
an uninfected host would have “normal” traffic, 
but when infected, the host begins random scanning 
looking for other vulnerable hosts on the network. 
 
In addition to propagating itself by finding additional 
vulnerable hosts, worms typically have some other malicious 
function.  It may direct users to certain websites or it may 
collect information from the infected host and report it 
back to some central computer.  It could also be malicious 
and try to destroy key files on the host computer [8]. 
Some examples of worms include the Morris worm (1988) 
[9], the first known instance of a worm, as well as the 
Nimda and the Code Red worms [10].   
2. Botnets 
Bots and networks of bots (“botnets”) are emerging as 
the most significant threat facing online ecosystems and 
computing assets [11]. Like viruses and worms, a bot is a 
self-propagating application (code) that infects vulnerable 
hosts through exploit activities in order to expand the 
reach of the Bot network [11].  Bots can use worms or other 
bots to propagate to other computers on the network.   
Bots can be distinguished from viruses and worms by 
their command and control characteristic: bots will normally 
include facilities that allow for control by some sort of 
Command and Control structure, be it a single server or some 
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type of distributed system.  Since bots can be controlled by 
a single entity, they can be remotely directed towards a 
single purpose.  A typical use for a bot is a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDOS) attack, where a massive number of 
bots can coordinate their traffic in order to overwhelm a 
network server [11]. 
Bot behaviors include those of worms outlined above, 
with the addition of command and control traffic that rides 
within different protocols: commonly Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) and Internet Relay Chat (IRC).  In actual 
bots, this traffic may or may not be encrypted.  Detection 
of bots through passive packet monitoring (as above—with 
protocol analysis by tools such as Snort or Wireshark) of 
data streams can be useful, as bots will often exhibit 
typical signatures or behaviors.  Like worms, the scanning 
behaviors used for propagation can also be detected 
passively and the results used for bot (and worm) 
identification [11].  Bots will often remain hidden until 
they receive instruction from the command and control server 
to execute some action, which is typically a denial of 
service attack as described above [12],[13].   
Perhaps the most widely known example of a bot is 
“Conficker,” which is still active at the time of this 
writing.  One estimate of Conficker held it responsible for 
8.9 million infections, and it appeared in a variety of 
different networks, including those of the German and 
British Armed Forces [14].  
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3. Viruses 
In Peter Czor’s The Art of Virus Research and Defense, 
he defines a computer virus as “…code that recursively 
replicates a possibly evolved copy of itself.  Viruses 
infect a host file or system area, or they simply modify a 
reference to such objects to take control and then multiply 
again to form new generations.” [15]  
Viruses can be classified by many categories. These 
include what computer architectures they target, such as 
processor types or operating systems; file systems and file 
formats; interpreted environments such as scripts (PHP, 
Jscript, Batch and Shell scripts) and macros; and more.  
They can also be classified as to how they infect, such as 
boot records, files, and in-memory.  They could be 
classified as to their defensive mechanisms, like tunneling, 
armored, retroviruses, morphing and encrypting.  Finally, 
they could be classified according to their payload, whether 
it is intended to be benign and non-destructive, 
destructive, data-stealing, or denial of service. 
Since all viruses are code and that code must reside 
somewhere on the host, the signature-based virus scanner 
periodically searches for those classic signatures on a 
system.  Only new viruses or emerging variants of existing 
viruses will cause the scanner to fail to match the stored 
signatures and claim that the code is safe. 
A canonical example of a virus is the “Anna Kournikova” 
virus. Although it did not have a malicious payload, it made 
its way through a bulletin board posting, through mass-
mailing capability, and social engineering (enticing people 
with a new picture of Anna Kournikova) to spread itself 
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around the world.  The file was a visual basic script: 
AnnaKournikova.jpg.vbs.  It duped the user into executing 
the script, e-mailing itself with the VBS attachment to 
everyone in the user’s e-mail address book.  Its payload was 
nothing except spam e-mails that quickly spanned the world 
[16]. 
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed the usage of red teams 
used in a DoD setting, and examples of exercises in which 
they are employed.  We also discussed some of the threat 
signatures and behaviors used by red teams, including bots, 
worms, and viruses.  In the following chapter, we assert 
that DoD use of red teams constrains how we train, and 
propose a information system solution.    
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III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
In this chapter, we make a few definitions, namely 
those of the “training objective” that we are training to, 
the “trainees” that are receiving the training, the 
“trainers” that train them, and the “safety observers” that 
observe all of the above.  We scope our discussion by a 
defining the training “environment,” as well as identify the 
problems with the DoD’s current approach to network 
training.  We proposed an information systems solution to 
those problems and give a detailed example scenario of its 
use.  We conclude the chapter with more detailed discussion 
of the above elements.   
A. THE TRAINING OBJECTIVE  
In order to simplify discussion, we make an initial 
definition: the training objective.  The training objective 
is the skill or behavior that we wish to reinforce.  We make 
no comment on the size, complexity, or specifics of the 
training objective—they can range from the simple to the 
very complex, e.g., from “pull the trigger” to “win the 
war.”  We limit our scope of training objectives to the 
specific behaviors that result from trainee interaction with 
malware/mal-behavior and its accompanying effects.  We also 
assume that training objectives correspond to specific 
threats which have specific behaviors.  Further, we do not 
discuss any specific training methodology or algorithm, as 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Below, we include an 
example training scenario, with its training objective.  
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In order to discuss any training tool, we must also 
identify the stakeholders.  Towards this, we propose three 
generalized parties typical in a military training 
environment and indeed, most training environments: the 
Trainee, the Trainer, and the Safety Observer.   
B. THE INTERESTED PARTIES IN TRAINING 
1. The Trainee 
The “trainee” is a person or group of persons in the 
organization that we wish to be trained to the training 
objective.  Specific examples could include network 
operations personnel, or perhaps even further up the stack 
of decision making, e.g., network managers.  
2. The Trainer 
The second participant in training is the “trainer.”  
The trainer is the person or organization that presents 
specific scenarios of behaviors to the trainee in order to 
evaluate the trainee’s performance vis-à-vis the training 
objective. Typical examples of trainers in military networks 
include “red teams” (who simulate the Tactic, Techniques, 
and Procedures (TTP) of adversaries) as well as less 
formalized trainers, e.g., the more experienced network 
operator training the less experienced.  In “high school” 
parlance, the trainee is the student, and the trainer is the 
teacher, though this relationship is not exclusive, i.e., 
the trainer may or may not be the one giving the 
instruction, but the trainer is limited to testing the skill 
of the trainee. 
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3. The Safety Observer 
The third participant in training is the safety 
observer.  In many training scenarios, we need to define a 
party separate from the trainer and the trainee that is 
responsible for maintaining oversight of the conduct of the 
training.  For example, during safety critical training, 
there is often a safety observer, whose scope of attention 
exceeds that of the training activities to include the 
impact of the training on the organization as a whole.  In 
“military training” parlance, this could be members of a so-
called “White Cell.”  Note that circumstance will sometimes 
dictate that either the trainer or trainee fill this role, 
e.g., in those training scenarios where the risk of training 
does not warrant the use of a separate party.  A specific 
example would be that of a senior network administrator 
tutoring a junior administrator while utilizing an isolated 
(non-networked) host.  An example of a needed safety 
observer would be training of such complexity that the 
trainer and trainee could not effectively train while 
simultaneously ensuring their training would not impact the 
safety of the organization, e.g., a large scale training 
scenario involving integrated operations from multiple major 
departments. Network training on an aircraft carrier network 
during flight operations and engineering drills would be an 
example of this.   
C. THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT 
Now that we have discussed the interested parties in 
our discussion of training, we must discuss the training 
environment. For the purpose of this thesis, we limit 
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ourselves to training the administrators of military 
networks.  That said, military networks vary enormously in 
terms of size and complexity, ranging from the completely 
isolated host in the training laboratory to the entire 
Global Information Grid, the military's global 
communications backbone comprising 15,000 networks and seven 
million computing devices across hundreds of installations 
in dozens of countries [17].  Note that DoD networks also 
span different classification levels, though we will not 
treat the requirements contained in these differences.  
Military networks include those of an administrative nature, 
e.g., training laboratories for network personnel, as well 
as networks of an operational nature, where lives and 
mission success literally depend on their effective 
utilization.   
The differences between these networks also indicate, 
ipso facto, greatly varying network infrastructure and 
topologies.  Some DoD networks have network firewalls, some 
have multiple tiers of them, and some have none.  Some 
networks are completely hidden inside Network Address 
Translation realms, and some are outward facing onto the 
global Internet.  Some networks are connected by high 
bandwidth fiber-optic cable, while others are connected by 
low-speed, high-latency satellite connections that offer 
slightly better connectivity than low-speed telephone 
modems.   
D. HOW WE CURRENTLY TRAIN 
The treatment Aland gives in the International Test and 
Evaluation Association Journal gives an excellent and timely 
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overview of the challenges faced by DoD leadership regarding 
Testing and Evaluation of DoD network Information Assurance, 
some of which are included below [18].  
1. Dependence on Red Teams  
One problem that the DoD faces with regards to training 
is that we depend heavily on red teams.  Red teams are a 
resource heavily in demand, provided by agencies that are 
faced with increasingly austere fiscal environments.  By use 
of this constrained resource, we limit the training options 
available.  An exercise planner simply cannot count on a red 
team being available for every exercise.   
2. Standardization 
Given the complexity of military networks, it is not 
hard to imagine that maintaining uniformity in training 
throughout a global organization is a difficult task.  
Although the DoD continues efforts to centralize network 
training, there remain disparate organizations using 
disparate tools and methodologies.  For example, it is not 
uncommon for a single unit to be trained by National 
Security Agency (NSA) Red and Blue Teams, for personnel to 
be serving as mentors in the same organization as the 
trainee, or for organizational training teams to exist at 
every echelon within an organization—all using a variety of 
different methods.  For this reason, it is difficult to 
maintain standardization in training across the different 
networks in the DoD.   
In addition to disparate organizations participating in 
the training, there are different organizations managing the 
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different networks as well. Each of these network management 
bodies imposes its own requirements on the trainers in order 
to minimize the impact of network training on the operations 
of the organization.   
It is also possible for the organization to confine 
their network training to a laboratory environment, vice the 
operational network, in order to minimize the impact of the 
training on operations.  A great example of this is the 
NSA’s annual Computer Defense Exercise (CDX), discussed in 
Chapter II: a geographically distributed but logically 
isolated exercise network.  The DoD keeps much of its 
training in the laboratory for good reason; one does not 
want to risk network behavior having negative effects on a 
unit’s primary operational (non-network) mission.  Robust 
network training, to a large degree, is considered too risky 
for operational units.  Some training methodologies, e.g. 
the release of a worm along the lines of Morris (discussed 
in Chapter II), could have unpredictable results.  Consider, 
for example, the trainer’s use of a worm whose effects were 
intended to be limited to the unit under assessment, but 
instead spread over the entire organizational network.   
Unfortunately, this deprives the operational units of 
the opportunity to observe how collateral network effects 
can affect the organization as a whole, e.g., seeing how the 
loss of a tertiary air traffic control information system 
due to a virus can affect the launching and recovery of 
aircraft.  For this reason, it is imperative that network 
training not be limited to the laboratory, but instead be 
integrated into a holistic assessment of the unit.  
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E. AN INFORMATION SYSTEM SOLUTION 
For these problems, we propose the development of a 
distributed, software-based training system that can be used 
by either simulated adversaries (such as red team) or 
trusted agents (such as blue team) to create scenarios and 
conditions to which a network management/defense team will 
need to react and resolve.  This system will be composed of 
currently available software packages and/or “homegrown” 
(locally generated) packages with the desired functionality.  
It will include clients that function as “Malware Mimics,” 
that is, software objects that intrinsically demonstrate 
externally observable attributes of the malware which it 
mimics, to include behaviors and possibly signatures, 
without putting the hosting network at risk.  The Malware 
Mimic Client will be constructed in such a way as to depict 
a variety of these behaviors, with sufficient flexibility 
for additional behaviors to be “bolted-on” as they are 
developed later in the system’s life, resulting in a 
sustainable evolution of the product.  This Malware Mimic 
System must be inherently benign, externally controllable, 
and include a tested “failsafe” condition for rapid 
neutralization and/or retraction (rollback) from the 
impacted network.  The tool should be scalable in order to 
depict the full range of malware characteristics, from low 
sophistication through high sophistication, and adjustable 
in real time.   
Specifically, we propose that the system be composed of 
two types of software packages: Malware Mimic Clients (MM-
Clients), and a central Malware Mimic Command and Control 
(MM-Server) Server.  The Malware Mimic Clients will be 
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lightweight software packages that “ride” upon host 
operating systems of the information systems (workstations, 
etc) of the trainee organization.  Each of these clients 
will be logically connected to a Malware Mimic Server, which 
will deliver commands to the Clients, both individually and 
in the aggregate.  Malware Mimic Clients will be capable of 
generating the behaviors of the malware/mal-behavior that we 
wished to emulate.   
For example, as discussed in Chapter II, a typical 
behavior in Internet worms is that they scan for adjacent 
vulnerable hosts.  In this case, we wish only to mimic the 
behavior of the worm, not the worm itself.  The MM-Client, 
when commanded by the MM-Server, could perform a port scan 
of adjacent hosts, just as if it was an actual worm.  To the 
observer, the behaviors will be identical, exactly as if a 
worm was propagating across a network when in fact, only the 
behaviors of the preexisting MM-Clients, commanded by the 
MM-Server, will be propagating.  In this manner, we greatly 
increase the training’s value (we duplicate the behavior of 
an Internet Worm on the network) without greatly increasing 
the risk to the network (we actually only duplicate the 
behaviors, not the malware itself).  Additionally, by using 
this typical client/server architecture, we can take 
advantage of the network property of distribution.  The 
trainer, operating the Mimic System, need not be collocated 
with the trainee of the network. 
We can reduce the risk to the network even further.  
MM-Clients will have only narrow windows to perform their 
behaviors before having to reconfirm their commands with the 
MM-Server.  This ensures that with a loss of network 
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connectivity, the clients do not continue “head-less,” i.e., 
operating independently of the trainer’s desires.   
Furthermore, using the “two-key” analogy commonly 
employed by ballistic missile systems, we can insert an 
additional server on the local network which serves as a 
local “kill switch.”  This second layer of “kill authority” 
will ensure that if emergent local conditions required an 
immediate halt to training that it could be commanded 
without the delay of notifying the trainer.   
In this manner, we solve the problems identified above: 
namely that we create a distributed training system that can 
be consistently and systematically employed across a variety 
of networks, safe enough to use on an operational network, 
all the while delivering the same training value of reacting 
to actual malware used in isolated laboratory environments. 
We can increase training value without concomitant increase 
in risk. 
As discussed, the proposed system will have the 
capability to command observable behaviors and signatures on 
remote hosts.  Additionally, it will include the ability for 
the trainer to monitor remote system status, as well as halt 
or continue the execution of behaviors as warranted by the 
operational situation.  The only interaction that the 
trainee will have with the system will be to observe 
behaviors and signatures generated by the system and react 
to them.  Finally, we propose to include the capability for 
an observer local to the training to have the ability to 
halt the execution of behaviors as local circumstances 
warrant.  All of these functions are summarized in Figure 1.  
 28
 
Figure 1.   Proposed use case. 
F. AN EXAMPLE TRAINING SCENARIO 
Based on the proposed use case of our system, a more 
detailed training scenario may proceed as follows.  This 
example assumes that the training would be formal and 
scripted in advance.    
1. Pre-exercise (PRE-EX) 
Prior to commencement of the exercise (COMEX), training 
objectives would be identified and tailored to the 
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particular trainee and training objective by interested 
parties.  In this scenario, the trainee would be an 
organization: specifically, the network administrators of 
all the ships of a Navy Carrier Strike Group, underway off 
the coast of Hawaii, performing predeployment training 
exercises. The network environment would be an unclassified 
administrative network between ships of the Strike Group and 
connected to the Global Information Grid.  The training 
objectives would be promulgated by the agency responsible 
for the exercise.  Additionally, the training scenario would 
be synchronized with other typical predeployment training, 
such as the launching and recovery of aircraft, tactical 
maneuvering and communications of the ships, etc., which 
would be happening simultaneously with the network training.  
The training objective to be covered in this example would 
be that network administrators correctly identify a botnet 
propagating across their network, and report this 
information to the higher echelon of command in accordance 
with previously established procedures.  The ships’ Combat 
Systems Training Team (CSTT) would serve as the notional 
“white cell,” i.e., safety observers for the exercise.     
The Malware Mimic Client software would be installed on 
the participating hosts of the strike group network, 
distributed throughout the ships of the group via software 
push.  These hosts would consist of the bulk of user 
workstations in the strike group.  The software could be 
installed significantly ahead of time, as it would not 
affect the operation of the workstation prior to COMEX, 
remaining effectively dormant in a “sleep state” until the 
prescribed exercise time.  Additionally, local to each ship 
of the group, a simple “kill server” would be initialized by 
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the CSTT members that could be used to terminate or freeze 
the exercise should local conditions warrant such action.  
Shortly prior to COMEX, all of the MM-Clients would 
establish a network link to the MM-Server co-located with 
the trainer, in this case a NSA red team physically located 
at Fort Meade, Maryland.  The MM-Clients would still not 
have any effect on the user’s workstation.   
2. Commencement of Exercise (COMEX) 
At the commencement of the exercise, the ships of the 
trainee (strike group) network, again, underway off the 
coast of Hawaii, would enter a Combat Systems Training 
Environment. This requires notification be passed throughout 
the ships of the group that ship systems were actively being 
used to support training and that actual systems casualties 
would be announced as such.  CSTT members would take their 
posts and begin monitoring the system administrators 
(trainees).  The red team (trainer) members, again located 
at their facility in Maryland, would log in to the MM-
Server.  They would select from their GUI menu the exercise 
trainee (our notional strike group).  Per the exercise 
script, they would instantiate predefined software behaviors 
on the remote workstations of the strike group network.  
These particular modules would consist of behaviors to 
emulate a botnet propagating across the network. As such, 
network hosts would begin to scan the network in search of 
other “vulnerable” hosts in order to make network 
connections with them, at which point the scanned hosts 
would begin to scan the network as well.  These scans would 
be accompanied by dramatic increases in host network output 
as the hosts simulate the sending of information off the 
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network to a notional botnet command and control server.  In 
reality, this would be a coordinated, ever-growing amount of 
relatively benign scans or inert Internet Protocol (IP) 
packets which would cause an increase of network traffic.   
The first indication of the emulated botnet on the 
trainee network would be a slowing of network traffic due to 
the congestion induced by the network scans and generated 
traffic.  User logins would take longer due to the slow 
connection to the Active Directory server.  Web traffic 
would slow down as well, as DNS queries are also delayed due 
to the congestion.  Our trainees, busy with other duties 
assigned to them, would not yet notice the increase of 
network activity, the slowing of network traffic, or that 
the network monitoring systems of their network were 
indicating that the system was being scanned internally.   
As the botnet behavior “propagates” across the hosts of 
the network, the network would continue to slow; e-mail 
traffic would now be affected as the volume of network 
traffic increased.  Administrative work on the network 
workstations become affected as e-mail and chat traffic are 
affected.  It can be expected that the help desk switchboard 
would “light-up” with complaints from users.  Expectantly, 
the system administrators would be notified. 
Upon inspection by the now alerted network 
administrators, the network would be determined to be under 
duress.  Network management systems would show alerts 
related to the volume of traffic on the network; protocol 
analyzers would show unusual network connections between 
hosts of the network, and log files would show that systems 
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were being probed by internal scanning. The network trouble-
call logs would be full of complaints by annoyed users. 
The network administrators should correctly identify 
the problem with the network as a botnet-based attack.  In 
accordance with established procedures, network 
administrators would notify the higher echelon that the 
network was infected by a botnet, who would in turn notify 
the NSA red team.  Red team members would note that the 
training objective had been completed as the botnet had been 
identified and that the higher echelon had been properly 
notified.  The CSTT would have Local Kill Authority.  Once 
the training was complete, and in light of the complaints of 
the many users of the network, the CSTT would activate the 
“local kill” function of the system.  The MM-Clients, no 
longer receiving the “go ahead” signal from the local kill 
server, would cease scanning and quickly revert to the pre-
exercise inert state.   
3. Post Exercise (POSTEX)  
POSTEX (following the exercise), the MM-Clients would 
signal to the MM-Server, located in Maryland, that they had 
been stopped.  The server operators (the red team) would 
note that the exercise had been halted locally, and confirm 
via out-of-band communication that the exercise had 
terminated normally.  Trainers, assessors, and the trainees 
would then compile their individual notes on the exercise, 
and debrief the exercise via conference call once local 
conditions permitted.  
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G. CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
This was a both a simple and contrived example of the 
Malware Mimic’s function, but it gives insight into a basic 
architecture from which to discuss, in further detail, the 
different features of the system.  In the above example, we 
assume an unclassified, geographically remote, and tactical 
network.  In reality, the Malware Mimic should scale well 
enough for administrators of any sized network to be 
trained, be it as small as a subset of a tactical network, 
or span multiple Autonomous Systems.  The only limitation 
should be the management of the software packages that need 
to be pushed to the individual hosts of the trainee network, 
and limitations inherent in the architecture of the Command 
and Control structure of the Malware Mimic System. 
In our example, we assumed an administrative network, 
but by use of both remote and local kill capability, as well 
as nearly instantaneous “roll-back” of the behaviors to a 
pre-exercise state, the Malware Mimic would be appropriate 
on networks where mission critical services are located.  
Note that in our example, the network behaviors are not 
performed on a network that is isolated in an air-gapped 
laboratory—the intent of the Malware Mimic is to get the 
training out of the lab and classroom, and into the actual 
operating environments of the trainees.  Obviously, the more 
critical the systems (risk), the more care in the 
implementation of the emulated behaviors will have to be 
taken (controls/safeguards).   
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H. CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE TRAINER 
Trainers on the system need not be geographically 
removed from the training environment. The power of the 
network allows the trainer to be located anywhere on the 
network, either remote or local.  In our example, the 
trainer was in Maryland and the trainee was underway off the 
coast of Hawaii, but in reality, the location of the two 
parties could be any location linked together by the 
network.   
Additionally, trainers need not be formalized, e.g., 
red team members.  Assuming that a MM-Server is installed on 
the network and that a properly training operator of the 
server exists, training could be accomplished locally by the 
trainees themselves; that is, the “trainer” and “trainee” 
could be the same person or persons.   
1. Expanded Modules 
In our example, the threat was modeled as a botnet with 
the specific behavior of port scanning emulated.  Modules 
could be created that generate the effects of any category 
of malware discussed in Chapter II.  Any degree of 
complexity could be undertaken.  In our example, only one 
stage of botnet propagation was emulated.  Combinations of 
behaviors might be used to emulate specific threats.  For 
example, the Malware Mimics on one host could be commanded 
to first scan for vulnerable hosts (behavior one), then 
“appear” on another host (behavior two), then the new host 
begin its scan (behavior three) and make a link with a 
remote host, ostensibly to pipe information offsite 
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(behavior four).  This emulates in greater detail and 
complexity the lifecycle of a bot in a botnet.   
We are not limited to the behaviors of bots.  The 
Malware Mimics could just as easily be programmed to exhibit 
behaviors associated with a machine infected by a virus.  
Mimic-client host-machines could “pop-up” warning messages 
to users, asking them to contact system administrators to 
inform them of a mock “system infection.”  Host workstations 
could generate virus signatures identifiable by virus 
scanners.  Hosts offsite to the network could even be 
programmed to perform the same functions that a malicious 
hacker would perform on the trainee’s network.  
I. CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE TRAINEE 
In our example, our trainee was the network 
administration team of an entire Carrier Strike Group.  
Indeed, the “trainee” could be an individual, a team, or 
even an organization.  Further, we need not limit ourselves 
to network administrators.  The network effects generated by 
the Malware Mimic System, just as the effects of actual 
malware, can affect users, operators, managers, and decision 
makers further removed from the operation of a network.  
Their actions can be assessed using the Malware Mimic 
System, just as those of the network administrator. Consider 
the case involving the havoc created during flight 
operations by the loss of an entire mission critical 
information system; the response of system users or 
administrators in such a situation may have a profound 




to answer a question growing ever more important in modern 
combat operations: “How do the network operations impact the 
entire operational unit?” 
In this chapter, we enumerated the participants in 
training, as well as scoped our training environment to that 
of a military network. We proposed an information systems 
approach to the problem and give a detailed example scenario 
of its use.  In the following chapter, we give specifics on 
the construction of our solution, as well as the test bed 




IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST PLATFORM 
A. BACKGROUND 
This chapter will describe the creation of the MM-
Server and MM-Clients. It will discuss the design features 
built into the software and how the implementation of the 
client-server relationship.  In the first half, we will 
discuss the design of the modules that the MM-Clients will 
run, while the second half will discuss the creation of the 
test platform for this experiment.  Finally, the 
experiment’s goals will be defined and an explanation of how 
the experiment will be setup to accomplish those goals will 
be provided. 
B. SERVERS AND BOTS 
The architecture outlined in Chapter III was largely 
paralleled in our implementation, which includes a single 
command and control server (the MM-Server) that has a one-
to-many cardinality relationship with our remote client 
nodes (the MM-Clients). For both the MM-Server and the MM-
Client, we chose Java as the implementation language. The 
primary reason was portability; since we make no assumption 
on the physical architecture of the network, it was prudent 
to select a language that would run on a multitude of 
different platforms, to include Microsoft Windows and Linux.   
The functions provided by our implementation also 
parallel the architecture outlined in Chapter III.  A 
trainer gives commands via a user interface to the MM-
Server, which then commands the individual remote MM-Clients 
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to perform an externally-observable, network behavior.  The 
MM-Server commands that modules, consisting of the 
behaviors, on the remote MM-Clients be executed; MM-Clients 
receive the instruction to execute the module, and execute 
the preprogrammed function that performs the commanded 
behavior.   
1. Server Construction 
The MM-Server consists of six Java classes, including 
the data structure that maintains information on the client 
nodes of which the server is aware and the user interface.  
The MM-Server functions similarly to a Web server in that it 
spawns handlers to handle incoming connections from the MM-
Clients.  The server is multi-threaded to allow for multiple 
simultaneous Transport Control Protocol (TCP) connections 
and full-duplex communications with its MM-Clients.   
The data structure utilized to track connections 
between the server and remote MM-Clients is a Java 
Synchronized Sorted Map. The Synchronized Sorted Map offers 
built-in handling for the multi-threaded environment, and 
its use simplified the coding requirements significantly, 
i.e., it inherently handled issues of thread 
synchronization.  For larger (in terms of numbers of MM-
Clients) implementations, a database, such as MySQL should 
be used, though it will come at the cost of added 
complexity.   
In order to keep implementation as simple as possible 
(with an eye on scalability), the data structure maintains a 
traditional “mail box” model for MM-Client/Server 
communications; within the data structure, MM-Clients have 
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inboxes (orders) and status boxes.  Inboxes are set only by 
the server; status boxes are first initialized by the 
server, and then written to exclusively by the MM-Client. In 
this manner, synchronization issues with multiple MM-Clients 
are avoided.  The data structure is keyed uniquely by a 
concatenation of the host node’s machine name and a node 
name given at invocation.  The data structure also includes 
a field for explicitly declaring the exercise in which the 
node is participating, e.g., a specific strike group 
COMPTUEX.   
2. Client Construction 
On initialization, MM-Clients attempt to establish a 
TCP connection with the remote server whose socket pair 
address is declared in the invoking command-line parameters.  
If the remote server is not available, the MM-Client will 
continue to attempt contact every 10 seconds until the 
connection succeeds.   
Once the connection is established, the MM-Client 
requests the contents of its “inbox” from the MM-Server, 
then calls the appropriate module based on the response.  
Modules contain preprogrammed sets of behaviors.  Currently, 
there are three modules of behaviors.  Module Zero is an 
instruction for the MM-Client to cease commanded behaviors, 
and to return to an idle state.  In the idle state, the MM-
Client continues to request its inbox contents from the MM-
Sever at five-second intervals.  Module One commands five 
icmp “pings” of the MM-Server.  This module is used for 
connection troubleshooting.  Module Two commands a “SYN 
scan” of 10 random ports of the MM-Server.  This module is 
use to demonstrate the feasibility of a remotely-commanded, 
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externally observable, network behavior from the MM-Client.  
This behavior is intentionally modeled on the scans 
performed by the bots of a botnet, as discussed in Chapter 
II.     
Module Two’s complex scanning behavior is not native to 
Linux or to any of the Microsoft Operating Systems.  For 
these scans, we utilized Salvatore Sanfilippo’s “hping” 
software, available at www.hping.org under the GNU General 
Public License v2.  Use of hping on Microsoft Windows 
platforms additionally requires the use of CACE Technology’s 
WinPcap library (specifically, we used version 4.1.0.2001), 
whose license is currently available for viewing at 
www.winpcap.org/misc/copyright.htm.  Additionally, we had 
problems using hping version 3 on XP; reverting to version 2 
was required.  This version is currently available at 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/sectools/. 
Unfortunately, the use of hping clients on Linux hosts 
requires the use of raw sockets, which are not available 
without administrator privilege.  This can be overcome by 
appending the command for hping to the sudoers list of the 
Linux client, e.g., %admin ALL = NOPASSWD: /sbin/hping3.    
MM-Clients are not multi-threaded.  This is an 
intentional design feature incorporated for safety; MM-
Clients only execute limited amounts of code before blocking 
for a continuation confirmation from the MM-Server, and in 
the future, a “kill server” on the local network.  If at any 
point MM-Client connection with the MM-Server is lost, it 
ceases any commanded behaviors and reverts back to its 
initialization behavior, i.e., entering an “idle” loop, 
attempting to reconnect every ten seconds until successful.    
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3. Communication Protocol 
The communication protocol between the MM-Server and 
the MM-Client is shown in the flow chart shown in figure 
two.  The flow chart assumes that the MM-Server has a 
preexisting session established between one or more MM-
Clients.  When first initialized, the MM-Clients are in an 
idle state, as discussed above.  When the trainer inputs a 
module command to be executed into the user interface, that 
command is written by the server to the inbox of the MM-
Client.  The MM-Client periodically (currently set to every 
five seconds) retrieves its inbox, then confirms the command 
with the “local kill” server.  (The kill-switch feature is 
not yet implemented.)  If it receives a “continue,” the MM-
Client updates its status on the MM-Server, and executes one 
iteration of the commanded behavior.  At this point, it 
loops back to checking its inbox, and continues as above.   
Behavior iterations are, and shall be, kept at an 
acceptably small duration, in order to allow the trainer or 
local kill server to cease behaviors in a reasonable amount 
of time, currently set to 10 seconds.  As above, the MM-
Client blocks while checking its remote inbox or confirming 
its command with the local kill server.  If a halt is 
received in either situation, the MM-Client ceases 
behaviors, and reverts to an idle state.   
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Figure 2.   Communication protocol flow diagram. 
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The communications between the MM-Server and the MM-
Client are passed in clear text, vice the host of other 
message passing facilities available in Java.  The reason 
for this design decision was two-fold. First, the observable 
plain-text is much easier to troubleshoot.  Second, the 
client-server session could utilize port 80, encapsulating 
the commands in Hypertext Markup Language, and in this way, 
be less likely to be flagged by any intrusion detection 
system that might be at a point between the MM-Server and 
MM-Client. This encapsulation feature is not yet implemented 
in the code.   
4. Graphical User Interface for MM-Server 
It was desired for this program to have a Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) as well.  Once the MM-Server is adopted 
and is utilized to control hundreds to thousands of 
computers, then a GUI may be essential to ease the 
administrative tasks of monitoring the status of the MM-
Clients, and controlling their behavior by issuing tasks to 
individual or groups of MM-Clients on the network. 
The GUI was designed using the NetBeans Integrated 
Development Environment (IDE) 6.9.1.  NetBeans provides an 
efficient and user-friendly design tool for developing rapid 
prototypes of graphical user interfaces.  The tool also does 
a great deal of the coding of the layout; as the user 
establishes the look-and-feel of the interface by 
instantiating the frames, panes, and the locations of the 
fields, buttons, and labels, the coding is done in the 
background for the layout and format of all these items. 
This relieves the developer of much of the tedious tasks 
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associated with layout development and enables him to remain 
focused on the functionality to be provided.  
The initial GUI design contains three different views: 
an icon-based view, a tree-based (or folder) view, and a 
tabular view.  The tree-based view was implemented in this 
thesis, while the icon and tabular views are left for 
further study.  The tree-based view is very similar to the 
file management tools in Windows, Macintosh, and Linux 
environments. 
Each MM-Client is a node within a tree.  By clicking on 
those nodes, the status of that MM-Client is displayed along 
with the ability to give new orders to the MM-Client.  In 
time, the ability to select multiple MM-Clients and submit a 
batch order to the group will be implemented. Such a 
capability will enhance the controller’s ability to rapidly 
manage the training or evaluation scenarios.  
C. BUILDING THE TEST PLATFORM 
For our test, we built a small network of 20 nodes. In 
a real case of deployment, since our system is envisioned to 
be running as a distributed system, the MM-client software 
should be installed on many, if not all, devices in an 
organization connected to a MM-server.  Therefore, it must 
be shown that the MM-server can handle the communication 
between multiple networked devices and that there would be a 
minimal delay from the time the command is given to a subset 
of MM-clients to the actual execution of that command. This 
delay should be dominated by the network-dependent 
characteristics of the messages, such as transmission, 
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propagation, and queuing delays, and not their processing by 
the MM-Server of MM-Client applications.  
We designed a test platform based on virtualization for 
evaluating the MM-server and MM-clients. This test 
environment allows for greater flexibility in the types of 
operating systems utilized, minimal footprint taken up by 
equipment and cable runs, and for general expansion of the 
number of MM-clients run. 
VMware’s products were utilized in our thesis, in 
particular VMware View and VMware Workstation. These 
products will hereafter be referred to as a VMware Player.  
VMware allows many different Operating Systems to run as 
Virtual Machines on a single host platform. A Virtual 
Machine is essentially a complete, logical, computing 
machine.  The user perceives the VM (Virtual Machine) as an 
entire computer solely running a particular Operating System 
and software.  The VM is actually just another program being 
run by the host computer’s Operating System (OS) with memory 
requirements.  The file manager installed with the host OS 
allocates a large file on the hard drive which is accessed 
as a virtual disk from the VM.  The VMware Player 
virtualization layer maps the actual physical resources of 
the host computer to the virtual machine’s resources.  
Device driver support is inherited from the host OS.   As 
such, activity inside the VM is handled by the host OS, 
device drivers, or directly by the hardware. 
The VMware View or VMware Workstation program serves as 
a translator between the virtualized OS and the host 
computer.  VMware translates desired commands into commands 
that must be scheduled and performed by the host’s processor 
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and other resources.  This translator is referred to as the 
hypervisor.  A hypervisor is a piece of software that is 
closely tied to the host OS or to the host computer’s 
hardware.  Each VM is entirely encapsulated and must make 
all processor, resource, and device driver calls through 
this hypervisor.  The hypervisor is in charge of 
coordinating all of these requests to the host OS or host 
computing machinery. 
The host computer must have adequate hard drive space 
for a large file that will contain the VM’s virtualized hard 
drive and sufficiently large physical memory (RAM) to be 
allocated to the VM’s running process. The greater the 
number of virtualized hosts on a given platform the greater 
the demands for hard-drive space and RAM. A common and 
current computer can run the host OS and one or two VMs 
simultaneously. To do more requires a much more powerful 
computer. 
Virtualization can be leveraged further—instead of 
using desktop computers, more powerful servers were 
utilized.  The test platform was built utilizing two Dell 
PowerEdge 2950 Servers (eight 32-bit processors, 4 GB of 
main-memory (RAM), and 131 GB hard drive storage).  These 
servers provide the capacity and performance required to run 
more than just a few VMs at once.  Similar to the VMware 
View/Workstation program, a hypervisor is required to 
coordinate the use of the hardware’s resources by the 
running VMs.  VMware vSphere Hypervisor is a rebranding of 




vSphere Hypervisor runs on the “bare metal,” meaning that no 
host OS must be installed on the server in order to support 
the hypervisor.   
Besides the two physical servers, a Dell Latitude E6510 
laptop with an Intel i7 Core, 64-bit processor, and 8 GB of 
RAM was required.  The laptop was our tool for creating VMs, 
converting them for use with the hypervisor, and 
transferring them to the physical servers.  Once the VMs 
were transferred, the laptop was our means for controlling 
which VMs were active on the server, and for accessing 
inside each individual VM as if it were a separate computer 
awaiting our commands.   
VMware View allowed us to create the VMs that would be 
installed onto the servers.  Using the iso images of the 
Ubuntu 10.10, Ubuntu Server 10.10, and Windows XP Service 
Pack (SP) 3 Operating Systems, we created three individual 
VMs. Once the installation was complete, each VM was 
accessed and the additional software was installed: Java 
Runtime Environment, MM-Client, MM-Server, Wireshark, and 
hping. 
VMware Converter allowed us to transport the VMs from 
the laptop to the servers.  VMware Converter can take many 
different VM types and create a VM that is compatible with 
the hypervisor.  These VM types include other VMware-based 
VM, Microsoft VMs, and other third party images, such as 
Norton Ghost images.  The VMs and/or images must be loaded 
onto the servers hosting the hypervisor with VMware 
Converter.  Failure to do so will result in VMs that do not 
work and that may possibly corrupt VMs previously loaded 
onto the server.   
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Once the VMs are loaded via the VMware Converter, the 
last required piece of software is used: VMware vSphere 
Client.  This software is the management that that allows us 
to coordinate the actions of all the loaded VMs on the 
servers.  Through the vSphere Client, all of the loaded VMs 
can be accessed.  Similar to the VMware View program, these 
VMs can be started, stopped, suspended, or restarted.  Once 
running, a console window can be accessed which allows the 
user to fully utilize the hosting system just as if it was 
on the controlling laptop.  Furthermore, vSphere Client can 
provide statistics on each individual running VM or the 
entire physical server.  Figure three shows the physical 
layout of the test platform along with the installed 
software.   
 
Figure 3.   Physical test bed configuration. 
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D. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
The overarching goal of the experiment was to have a 
single running MM-Server with approximately 20 MM-Clients 
connected to it.  Once all the machines were connected, we 
wished to show that the machines could be controlled in a 
timely fashion and that MM-Clients would generate an 
externally observable network behavior.   
Another goal was to verify the MM-Server and MM-Client 
software could work on Windows and Linux environments.  Most 
of the computers used by DoD commands are running Microsoft 
OS’s: primarily Windows XP.  For example, the Navy and 
Marine Corps Infrastructure and the shipboard IT-21 program 
also typically use Windows XP.  Other OS’s used within the 
DoD are Linux or Solaris based.  It was mandatory that we 
verify that our code worked on the common platforms within 
the DoD and to prove the MM-Client’s portability between the 
various OS’s. 
One obstacle identified in the setup of the experiment 
was the licensing limitations of the VMware vSphere Client.  
The VMware vSphere Client license is limited to ten 
activated VMs at any one time.  Due to licensing 
restrictions, utilizing two servers, only twenty VMs can be 
running simultaneously.   The physical servers can have more 
VMs installed, but only ten of those installed VMs can be 
activated at once.  One VM was configured as the MM-Server.  
The other 19 ran the MM-Client software. 
1. Operating Systems and Software Utilized 
Each host, less one, was running the MM-Client 
software.  One client was designated as the MM-Server; it 
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ran the MM-Server software. For each to run, the Java 
Runtime Environment (JRE) was installed on each machine.  
The JRE was downloaded from Java’s website for the Windows 
XP SP3 VMs. The package openjdk-6-jre-headless was 
downloaded and installed on the Ubuntu and Ubuntu Server 
images.  The operating systems utilized on the VMs were 
Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack (SP) 3, with all updates 
installed; Ubuntu 10.10; and Ubuntu Server 10.10.  Section 
B.2 above has information about the software that was 
utilized for each of the modules.  Again, Microsoft XP was 
selected, as it runs upon the preponderance of DoD 
workstations.  
The MM-Server was run on an Ubuntu host VM.  The MM-
Server also served as the network monitor; towards this, MM-
Client nodes were configured to direct network behaviors at 
the MM-Server.  Utilizing the MM-Server’s Module 0 (the 
initial and idle state for all of the MM-Clients), the MM-
Client query the mailbox at the MM-Server for commands.  In 
Module 1, the MM-Client sends a series of ICMP pings to the 
MM-Server.  In Module 2, the MM-Client utilizes performs a 
SYN-scan of the MM-Server.  All of the traffic was destined 
for the MM-Server whose computer would also be running 
Wireshark, a protocol analyzer.  Finally, the MM-Server was 
also configured as a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCP) server so that all of the VMs would not have to be 
assigned static IP addresses during test-bed startup. 
It was desired for all traffic to be targeted to the 
MM-Server so that all communications and results of the 
running modules could be captured and analyzed.  The 
experiment’s goals were verification that the system worked, 
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verification of the timeliness with which the MM-Clients 
obeyed the commands, verification of correct behaviors of 
the MM-Clients running the modules. 
Specifically, the test bed was set up as such: 
• Command and Control Server 
 Ubuntu Operating System 
 MM-Server 
 DHCP Server 
 Wireshark  
• Nineteen (19) Hosts 
 MM-Client receiving commands from the MM-
Server 
 Assigned IP addresses from the DHCP server 
 Five (5) hosts running Ubuntu Desktop OS 
 Five (5) hosts running Win XP SP3 OS 
 Nine (9) hosts running Ubuntu Server OS 
This is represented graphically in figure four. 
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Figure 4.   Virtual test bed configuration. 
E. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT 
The VM that hosts the MM-Server, DHCP server, and 
Wireshark must be started first.  Then, all of the other VMs 
may be started and the MM-Client software executed.  While 
the MM-Clients connect to the MM-Server, status messages on 
the MM-Clients and MM-Server should be monitored to verify 
the connection made between the MM-Server and each MM-
Client.  Furthermore, Wireshark can be used to monitor the 
externally observable network behavior of MM-Clients 
querying their mailbox on the MM-Server for updated 
commands. 
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For purpose of our experiment, once all VMs and 
programs were started, we would verify that all programs 
respond to the changes of the requested running module by 
the MM-Server.  Data would be analyzed using Wireshark to 
examine the change in network traffic directed at the MM-
Server.  Once all changes between module states zero to two 
were verified, each module would be run for up to five 
minutes to allow the system to reach a steady-state.  
Finally, the MM-Server would be stopped and Wireshark used 
to assess the changes in behavior of the MM-Clients as they 
changed from a running module to a failsafe state. 
During all of the above, performance data would be 
captured about the server, to include CPU utilization, 
memory allocation, disk activity, network capacity used, and 
other statistics.  The purpose of this data collection was 
to support an analysis of the strain under which the two 
servers are operating during this test. 
The overarching purpose of this experiment would be to 
verify the system functions as designed.  It would also be 
to verify that the MM-Server could handle multiple 
connections and that there would be timely changes in 
requested behavior by the MM-Clients.  Finally, it would 
assess whether there was any strain upon the MM-Server or 
the physical servers themselves due to operation all of the 
virtual machines (this would indicate a scalability issue 
for a small deployment venue). As such, the experiment would 
serve to establish a benchmark for the performance of the 
Malware-Mimic System in a benign environment. 
 54
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the system infrastructure 
consisting of the command and control MM-Server and the 
remote MM-Clients.  The protocol’s design was examined, 
specifically in relation to how the MM-Clients would receive 
the orders from the MM-Server.  The protocol was designed 
with safety as the paramount feature.  The MM-Clients must 
have guidance in order to start the modules.  That guidance 
must persist for a new iteration of behavior to occur.  
The test platform and the general design of the 
experiment were discussed.  The test platform relies heavily 
upon virtualization. Virtualization allows for a varying 
number of systems to be activated, a variety of operating 
systems that can be utilized, and various network 
configurations, so that the MM-Server and MM-Client software 
can be fully vetted.  It also forms a platform for further 
expansion in the formulation and testing of new modules, new 
operating systems, and more complex networks. The next 




This section provides details about the implementation, 
as well as the results of the experiment delineated in 
Chapter IV.  The results demonstrated the viability of this 
novel training and evaluation tool.  The protocol functioned 
as it was designed, with feedback between the MM-Server and 
the MM-Clients. The safety features were adequate in 
restoring the MM-Clients to their failsafe state during 
interruptions in network connections with their respective 
MM-Sever. Observable network traffic was positively 
identified which can fulfill training and analysis 
objectives.  Finally, it was verified that the test platform 
is a suitable testing environment prior to deployment on a 
live network. 
B. SETUP 
The two servers began the experiment in steady state 
with all VMs shutdown.  On the laptop, we connected to each 
Physical Server utilizing vSphere. The Ubuntu VM that would 
run the MM-Server on Physical Server 2 was the first VM 
started.  This was needed because that VM had a fixed IP 
address (10.19.61.123) and also hosted the DHCP server that 
would allocate IP addresses to all of the other VMs as they 
started up.  Once the DHCP service was operating, all 
nineteen of the other VMs were started.  Figure 5 shows 
which types of VMs were running along with their respective 
IP addresses on each physical server. 
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Figure 5.   Physical server IP addresses/type/names. 
The specific IP addresses of the Physical Servers were 
not relevant for the experiment.  The IP addresses 
facilitated connections via the laptop running the VMware 
vSphere Client software in order to control all of the VMs 
running on the servers.  The controlling laptop was given an 
IP address of 10.19.61.235. 
Physical Server 1 had five MM-Clients running on the 
Windows XP Professional Service Pack 3 (WINXP SP3) Operating 
System VMs, and five MM-Clients running on the Ubuntu 10.10 
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Operating System VMs.  Physical Server 2 had nine MM-
Clients, one per Ubuntu Server 10.10 VM, and the one MM-
Server running on the Ubuntu 10.10 VM.  All MM-Clients 
connected to the MM-Server at the IP address 10.19.61.123.  
The IP addresses were required so that the Wireshark packet 
capture could be analyzed in order to ensure all of the MM-
Clients were executing the correct module and to get a 




Figure 6.   Experiment Timeline of Events.  
The timeline (Figure 6) shows the order and times of 
specific events during the entire experiment.  This helped 
us correlate the information in all of the packets displayed 
in Wireshark with the events that occurred.  Furthermore, 
this timeline is meant to be used in conjunction with 
Figures 8 and 9 (showing CPU utilization per physical 
server).  The alphabetical labels on Figures 8 and 9 
correspond to the same labels in the left hand column in the 
timeline shown in Figure 6. 
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D. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Overall, the entire experiment verified system 
performance per the architecture set forth in Chapter II.  
All VMs functioned as configured, and all MM-Clients 
connected to the MM-Server performed the desired actions and 
responded to the changes in commands in less than ten 
seconds.  The MM-Server had no dropped packets on the 
Network Interface Card and Wireshark showed all of the 
traffic between the MM-Clients and the MM-Server. 
1. Results for MM-Server and MM-Clients 
The MM-Server performed according to specification.  
All MM-Clients connected to the MM-Server as designed.  The 
Ubuntu VM hosting the MM-Server operated with no degradation 
in performance under the load of the nineteen TCP sessions 
of the MM-Clients.  The Linux “top” command showed that the 
Java process of the MM-Server utilized approximately 0.3% of 
the CPU time.  It also showed that the percent of memory 
utilized by the same process started at 2.5% when no MM-
Clients were connected and only grew to 2.9% when all 
nineteen MM-Clients were connected.   
An example of the time it takes to transition between 
states for the MM-Client is given below.  Since the MM-
Server does not actively send a command to a MM-Client, the 
responsiveness between a typed command at the MM-Server and 
the MM-Client receiving that command, updating the MM-
Client’s status and then executing that command is somewhat 
slower than it could be.  However, as seen in Figure 7, it 
takes approximately 5-6 seconds for a MM-Client to cease the 
current running module, access and process the new order 
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from its mailbox in the MM-Server, update its status with 
the MM-Server and begin exhibiting the correct behavior of 
the newly ordered module.  This delay can be attributed to 
many different processes: physical, programmable, and 
virtual.  The physical realm deals with the actual signal 
propagating through the physical wires and switch.  Within 
the programs, the command is placed within the MM-Client’s 
inbox on the MM-Server and there is a delay depending on 
when the MM-Client “checks back in” with the MM-Server 
following a single iteration of the current ordered module.  
Finally, since there are two physical servers running twenty 
VMs, there are additional delays due to the non-
deterministic scheduling of the VMs, as well as the overhead 
of the hypervisor. 
 
Figure 7.   Packet Capture between MM-Client and MM-Server. 
The MM-Clients were designed for safety and the ability 
to be controlled remotely. Figure 7 is a sample of the 
latter, utilizing a Wireshark packet capture between the MM-
Client hosted on the WINXP_08_Client (10.19.61.67) and MM-
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Server (10.19.61.123).  To test the former, the experiment 
ended with an abrupt termination of the MM-Server with all 
nineteen MM-Clients having active TCP sessions.  The ensuing 
network traffic from the MM-Clients to the host which had 
been previously running MM-Server at 10.19.61.123 was 
captured by Wireshark.  Within seven seconds, all of the MM-
Clients that were running Module 2 entered their failsafe 
behavior.  All MM-Clients performed as expected, which 
suggests that the built-in safety mechanism performed as 
planned.  That is, if the MM-Server is no longer present to 
give orders, the MM-Clients will terminate all previous 
behaviors, revert to a benign, failsafe mode, and attempt to 
















2. Results for the Physical Servers 
 
Figure 8.   CPU Utilization of Physical Server #1.  
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Figure 9.   CPU Utilization of Physical Server #2. 
The performance of physical servers one and two (IP 
addresses (10.19.61.236 and 10.19.61.237, respectively) 
running the hypervisor and all of the VMs matched 
expectations.  According to the CPU utilization graphs 
(Figures 8 and 9), the large spikes in CPU utilization were 
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the actual starting and stopping of the VMs (points D and 
E).  The other large spikes occurred at points G and H, when 
all of the MM-Client software and Java Runtime Environment 
was activated. 
After the MM-Clients were started and connected to the 
MM-Server, CPU utilization of the actual physical servers 
was negligible.  The initialization and idle state (Module 
0) had the MM-Clients communicate once every ten seconds to 
the MM-Server in order to check for messages in their 
respective queue (Module 0 began at Labels I and L in 
Figures 8 and 9).  This activity had a negligible effect on 
the CPU, even though the CPU is “serving” both the MM-Server 
and the MM-Client entities.  Module 1 is not CPU-intensive, 
calling only a series of five pings back to the MM-Server 
per MM-Client instantiation for the module cycle of ten 
seconds (Module 1 began at Label J in Figures 8 and 9). 
Module 2 activated another process, hping, in order to 
perform a SYN scan of the MM-Server.  This shows an increase 
of about 15-20% CPU utilization on both physical servers 
(Module 2 began at Label K in Figures 8 and 9).  The 
physical servers handled the swapping between the ten VMs 




Figure 10.  Network Utilization of Physical Server #1.   
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Figure 11.  Network utilization of physical server #2.  
Hard disk activity of the physical servers was 
negligible.  Main memory (RAM) usage by each of the physical 
servers was as expected when running all of the VMs:  
approximately half of the onboard memory was utilized.  Each 
physical server had 4 GB of main memory.  Upon startup of 
all the VMs, memory peaked to almost full utilization.  Once 
all the VMs were fully booted up, logged into, and the MM-
Server and all MM-Clients activated, memory usage was 
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approximately 25-50% in steady state.  It is to be noted 
that for future work, if more VMs are to be run 
concurrently, the onboard memory should be increased to 8 or 
16 GB. 
Network activity of the physical servers due to the 
Malware Mimic system is harder to isolate and assess.  As 
seen in Figures 10 and 11, overall network traffic was well 
within the Gigabyte Ethernet capability of the server 
Network Interface Cards and the switch.  However, there are 
some large spikes in network traffic that must be explained.    
In Figure 10, the network traffic for Physical Server 1 
(.236), there were large spikes of approximately 2-3 
megabytes per second (MBps) at the setup and shutdown of the 
experiment and it was mostly steady around 200 kilobytes per 
second (KBps) during the actual running of the different MM-
Client modules.  The large spikes of 2-3 Mbps were due to 
the external connection of the laptop that contained the 
vSphere Client software.  Through vSphere, we utilized the 
remote console window to access every VM.  Once we were 
logged in to each VM and the MM-Client software was started, 
the now unneeded VM remote consoles were closed.   At the 
end of the experiment, the VMs were remotely logged into 
again, in order to stop the MM-Client software and shutdown 
the VMs.  The vSphere Client allowed a remote console 
window, giving full access to each VM as if sitting at a 
normal desktop computer.  All of these live video feeds of 
the running VM to our remote console were sent over the 
network connection from the Physical Servers to the laptop.  
This explains the large spikes at the beginning and end of 
the experiment as seen in Figure 10. 
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The network activity of Physical Server #2 (.237), 
shown in Figure 11 was similar to that of Physical Server 
#1, with the large 900-KBps spike at the startup of all the 
VMs.  This is less because the Physical Server #2 has nine 
Ubuntu Server OS VMs running.  The Ubuntu Server OS is 
accessed from a command prompt.  This interface was text-
based, unlike the graphical interfaces of the Ubuntu Desktop 
OS and WinXP OS.  Therefore, the amount of information sent 
over the network to our remote console was significantly 
less than the graphical environments of Ubuntu and Windows 
XP.  However, during the period when the different MM-Client 
modules were being accessed, Physical Server #2 has about 
twice the network activity.  This can partly be explained by 
the fact that the Ubuntu OS VM (.123), with the MM-Server 
software on Physical Server #2, was the only remote console 
utilized to control all of the MM-Clients.  Therefore, the 
live feed from that VM was sent over the network to the 
external laptop in order to control the flow of the 
experiment.   
To isolate the network traffic resulting solely from 
the VMs, Wireshark statistics from the Ubuntu VM running the 
MM-Server was used.  Wireshark provided an input/output 
graph of the amount of packets (or bytes) per unit time.  
The output was configured for bytes per second.  During the 
test run, with all MM-Clients running Module 0 (idle state), 
traffic to and from the MM-Server was 0.5-3 KBps.  When all 
MM-Clients were running Module 1 (ping), traffic was 1.5-8 
KBps.  When all MM-Clients were running Module 2 (SYN scan), 
traffic was 4.5-8 KBps.  Comparing these numbers to the 
graphs in Figures 10 and 11, we discovered that there is a 
significant amount of network traffic overhead for the 
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virtualization of network traffic as well as the live video 
feed for the remote console capability.  In comparison, if 
the MM-Server and MM-Clients were utilized on a live, 
operational network, the resulting network activity of 0.5-8 
KBps would be relatively insignificant compared to the 10, 
100 or 1000 MBps capacity of today’s networks. 
E. SUMMARY 
The experiment demonstrated that our system performed 
as designed.  All of the test goals were accomplished and 
there was an observable validation for each portion of the 
experiment.  This included the most important of the goals: 
demonstrating the ability to control the MM-Clients in a 
timely manner.  The MM-Clients were all responsive in 
changing to the ordered module, and when communication to 
the MM-Server was severed, all MM-Clients ceased their 
current activity and entered their failsafe mode. 
The results also show that the client-server 
relationship worked correctly, and can likely scale to a 
greater number of MM-Clients operating on differing network 
configurations.  Also, with the exception of possibly 
needing additional onboard memory for the Physical Servers, 
there is plenty of capacity with respect to CPU cycles, hard 
drive space, and network utilization for each of the 
physical test bed servers to accommodate more simultaneous 
VMs, as well as more complex network configurations. 
Next, in Chapter VI, we discuss our conclusions.  We 
also discuss our thoughts on future work in this area of 
study, to include code improvement, expansion, and security 
implications.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we proposed a solution to DoD 
overreliance on network analysis red teams for training and 
evaluation of network administrators by designing a novel 
network training tool.  This tool allows the integration of 
network evaluation into the highly complex training events 
typical of U.S. military training exercises.  The system we 
constructed had the following characteristics: 
• It was safe enough for production or operational 
environments.  Emulated behaviors would cease on 
command and “roll-back” to a pre-exercise state.  
Losses of network connection were treated as 
instructions to cease behaviors.  This would allow 
training to take place on the same network on 
which the trainees perform their mission.   
• Only malware behaviors were constructed, not 
actual malware itself.  Though we demonstrated the 
properties of a notional worm on the network, 
there was no actual malware involved.   
• The system constructed was distributed across the 
network, allowing for the trainer to be located 
anywhere on the network, local or remote.   
We then set out to construct a prototype for such a 
system, which we discussed in detail in Chapter IV.  
Following our treatment of the constructed system, we 
discussed the test bed that we created to test our system 
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concept vis-à-vis the goal we had set for ourselves, and 
proceeded to discuss the specific results acquired after 
establishing the test-bed and conducting a set of tests. 
We discovered that it is certainly possible to 
construct a system with the attributes discussed above.  We 
believe that this has the potential to revolutionize 
training for not only network administrators, but for the 
decision makers that are affected by malicious actions 
against such networks.  We also noted that the system 
performs as expected with regards to safety, namely, that it 
did not perform uncommanded behavior at any point during 
testing.  The system ceased all emulated behaviors within a 
suitable small time upon receipt of the trainer injected 
“cease-action” command—without exception.  This particular 
system quality is essential for its forecasted use on 
operational networks, and in this capacity, the MM-System is 
ready for a validation in an operational or production 
environment. 
We also discovered we essentially built a botnet, as 
discussed in Chapter II, complete with a command and control 
architecture and slave-node functionality without the 
dangerous behavior of actual propagation across the network. 
This, we believe, could form the basis of an existence proof 
for the size to which our Malware Mimic System architecture 
can scale.  Using Conficker as an example (also discussed in 
Chapter II), it is possible that this tool could scale to 
thousands of hosts, with some modification to the code, 
allowing the training and evaluation of the administrators 
of networks on the order of Tier One Internet Service 
Providers.   
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B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Code Improvement and Extension 
As with any software early in its lifecycle, the code 
needs refinement. For example, we found that the keying 
system for our data structure (mapping between keys and 
actual nodes) was unwieldy. It is essential that this key 
uniquely correspond to a MM-Client node, which we 
accomplished by using a combination of the given node’s host 
name and a user assigned name given at invocation.  However, 
this does not scale well, as it requires a unique naming 
system to be created and tracked by those parties 
responsible for instantiating the nodes.  Instead, we would 
suggest using a naming scheme that would allow for unique 
names to be generated and maintained by the hosts 
themselves, without involvement by any human user.  
Furthermore, the Data Structure will, at some point, need to 
be replaced by a robust, industrial grade database that can 
maintain records on the order of thousands, vice the data 
structure we utilized, discussed in Chapter III.   
We described a local “kill server” and its role in the 
communication protocol of the MM-Mimic system in Chapter 
III, but we provided no implementation.  We foresee a 
modification to the MM-Client code that allows for local 
pre-emption or blocking of remote taskings using UDP-based 
requests to local “kill server” located on the trainee 
network.  Construction of this “kill server” could largely 
be modeled on the MM-Server architecture discussed in 
Chapter III; again, using datagram vice stream socket 
connections.   
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There are several improvements that could affect the 
scalability of the software.  As it stands, there is no 
organic capability implemented to remotely “push” MM-Client 
code to machines on the trainee network.  Additionally, 
there is no capability to distribute updates over the 
network. The implication of this is that the MM-Client nodes 
must have all desired behaviors preprogrammed into the MM-
Client software on the host machine.  A more agile solution 
would be to have modules of behaviors sent to MM-Client 
nodes via software push, increasing the flexibility, 
adaptability, and, possibly, security of the MM-Mimic 
system. Such a scheme would require authentication and 
integrity verification to ensure only authorized behaviors 
are distributed. 
2. More Advanced Modules 
The training value in our first iteration of the MM-
System is limited.  That said, there is a rich framework 
laid out upon which more complex modules, with corresponding 
training scenarios, could be developed.  We foresee modules 
that would allow the MM-Client nodes to mimic virus 
behavior, as outlined in Chapter II, including, but not 
limited to host machines showing virus “signatures” that 
would be visible on installed anti-virus systems. Such 
signatures would need to be “hidden,” likely through 
encryption, until the behavior is commanded.  MM-Client 
nodes could show “pop-up” messages that would instruct users 
to contact their system administrators. MM-Clients could 
increase their system resource consumption, increasing the 
discomfort level of human users utilizing the system.  More 
advanced and realistic worm behaviors could be programmed; 
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simulation of worm behaviors propagating across a network, 
or delivering a “payload” would be an example of this.   
We have limited ourselves to discussing the behaviors 
of malware—worms, botnets and the like. However, human-
centric behavior continues to be a critical aspect of system 
hardening. Emulating such behavior to train operators to 
recognize it when it occurs could be beneficial. Determining 
whether or not there exists discernable differences between 
the observable behaviors of a human adversary, a “hacker” in 
popular parlance, and programmatic behaviors of the MM-
System would be a first step to implementing “human” 
behaviors.  We believe that the emulated threat behaviors of 
the MM-System could be expanded to include those of 
“hackers” as well, perhaps through well-scripted “mock” 
user-sessions.   
3. Increase Scale of Test Bed 
Code development is one area for further advancement; 
but the path forward for the project in the whole will rely 
on the system being tested on human users on a scale 
representative of the training networks to which the system 
is destined.  Towards this, expansion of the test bed will 
be required to an appropriate number of clients well beyond 
the twenty used for initial test bed.  Testing of the system 
should also be conducted on networks more complex than the 
single subnet system we utilized, again, to validate the 
system for networks more representative of its anticipated 
use.  Additionally, as discussed in Chapter V, we relied on 




network behaviors. We must additionally test our system 
against common intrusion detection systems used in the field 
today, e.g., Snort. 
4. Security Implications 
We made no security assumptions in our architecture, 
nor did we treat security implications in our 
experimentation.  Before the MM-System is ready for field 
use, security analysis must be performed.  The architecture 
should be suitable for this environment, however, as the 
system architecture was conceived with security in mind, 
with an eye on eventual deployment on DoD networks.  Java is 
common on DoD networks.  Host-based network software is 
common on DoD networks.  No mechanism yet exists to prevent 
unauthorized third parties from remotely commanding MM-node 
behavior, but again using existing botnets such as Conficker 
as an example, this too should be possible.  But the 
fundamental approach to the system is its greatest asset: 
only malware behaviors are employed on the trainee network, 
not actual malware.  Therefore, no behavior can happen on 
the network that is not explicitly coded into the MM-
Clients. In this way, the MM-System behaviors can be 
tailored according to the risk tolerance of the trainee 
networks.   
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APPENDIX A. MM-SERVER: CANDCSERVER.JAVA 
/*********************************************************************/ 
/*                                                               */ 
/*      Program:  Malware Mimic Server       */ 
/*                                                               */ 
/*      Top level for the MM-Server.  Interfaces with the user   */ 
/*      via the UI. Handles incoming TCP connections on all      */ 
/*  interfaces on TCP.port == 30000 with remote or local     */ 
/*  MM-Clients.  Maintains and closes TCP sessions with       */ 
/*      MM-Clients.  Translates user instructions to MM-Clients   */ 
/*      and passes the commands to MM-Clients.  Allows input      */ 
/*  from MM-Clients to UI.  Maintains state on MM-Clients.    */ 
/*      FILE:       ClientProgram.java              */ 
/*                                                               */ 
/*      USAGE: ./MM-Server <with no paramters>      */ 
/*                                                               */ 
/*                                                               */ 
/* AUTHORS: W. Taff and P. Salevski                          */ 
/*                                                               */ 
/* DATE: 22 January 2011                      */ 










 * The server - top level for program, and listener for connections. 
 * Initializes the database.  Starts the UI.   
 * Sits and listens for connections, spins off CC-Communicators 
 * to handle them and passes off Socket to same, then reset to  
 * listen.    
 *  
 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 * 
 */ 
public class CandCserver { 
 
 /** 
  * @param args 
  */ 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
 
 
  /////////////////////////////////////////// 
  //INITIALIZATION 
  /////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
  ClientDatabase dataBase = new ClientDatabase(); 
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  Integer listenPort = 30000; 
 
  Socket clntSock = null;   
 
 
  //start the UI 
  Thread GUIthread = new Thread( 
    new CandCserverMenuUI(dataBase)); 




  try { 
  ServerSocket server = new ServerSocket      
(listenPort); 
 
   System.out.println ("Server Listening on port " 
           
 
 
   while (true){ 
 
    System.out.println ("Waiting"); 
 
    clntSock = server.accept(); 
 
 System.out.println ("Connection Accepted  
from " + clntSock.getInetAddress() ); 
 
Thread thread = new Thread(new 
ClientCommunicator(clntSock, dataBase)); 
 
    thread.start(); 
 
 
   }//end while 
 
  } 
  catch (IOException ioe) { 
   System.err.println (ioe); 








APPENDIX B. MM-SERVER: CANDCSERVERMENUUI.JAVA 
package commandserver; 
//Filename: CandCserverMenuUI.java 





 * Rudimentary command line, console based ui 
 * Used for troubleshooting and functionality verification; will 
 * likely be replaced with graphical version.   
 *  
 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 * 
 */ 
public class CandCserverMenuUI implements Runnable { 
 
 
 /** need access to db to invoke methods */ 




 public CandCserverMenuUI(ClientDatabase dbInput){ 
 





 /* (non-Javadoc) 
  * @see java.lang.Runnable#run() 
  */ 
 public void run() { 
 
  uiConsole(); 
 
 






 private void uiConsole() { 
 
 //OF FORM: commands, module numbers (if any), and targets 
  // e.g. MOD_0:ALL  or maybe PRINT:ALL 
  // if no target, assume ALL 
 
  Scanner adminInputScanner = new Scanner(System.in); 
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  String inputString = ""; 
 
  int cmdDelimValue; 
 
  String command = null; 
 
  String target = null; 
 
  int moduleNumber = 999;   
 
  while (inputString.compareTo("QUIT")!=0){ 
 
   inputString = adminInputScanner.next(); 
 
   inputString = inputString.toUpperCase(); 
 
   cmdDelimValue = inputString.length(); 
 
 
   try { 





  command = inputString.substring(0, 




     + 1); } 
 
    else { 
 
     command = inputString; 
 
     target = "ALL"; 
 
    } 
 
 
    if (inputString.contains("_")){ 
 
int modDelimValue = 








command = command.substring(0, 




    } 
 
 
   } catch (Exception e) { 
 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
 
   




   } 
 
 
   System.out.println("Command is:"  
     + command ); 
 
 
   System.out.println("Target is:"  
     + target ); 
 
 
   System.out.println("Module Number is:"  
     + moduleNumber ); 
 
 
   //THE COMMANDS 
 
 
   if (command.compareTo("PRINT") == 0){ 
 
    print(target); 
 
   } 
 
 
   else if (command.compareTo("HALT") == 0){ 
 
    halt(target); 
 
   } 
 
   else if (command.compareTo("MOD") == 0){ 
 
    mod(moduleNumber, target); 
 
   } 
 
   else { 
 
//    db.getRecord(command).getCC(). 











  }//end while 
 
  System.out.println("Got quit command"); 
 











 private void mod(int moduleNumber, String target) { 
 
  System.out.println("Running MOD_" + moduleNumber); 
 








 private void halt(String target) { 
 
  if (target.compareTo("ALL")==0){ 
 
  System.out.println("Halting All!"); 
 
  db.halt_module(); 
 










  * Print records in the database.   
  * @param target  
  */ 
 private void print(String target) { 
 
 81
  if (target.compareTo("ALL")==0){ 
 
   String printBuffer = db.getAllrecordsFromDB(); 
 
   System.out.println("Host, Exercise, Inbox, 
Status"); 
 
   System.out.println(printBuffer); 
 
  }//endif 
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APPENDIX C. MM-SERVER: CLIENTCOMMUNICATOR.JAVA 
// Filename: ClientCommunicator.java 









 * A handler that maintains the session between server and client. 
 * Runs as a thread that is started by server.  On run, spins off  
 * a threaded Client Listener to accept input, and calls MM-node 
 * for Name and Status.   
 *  
 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 */ 
public class ClientCommunicator implements Runnable{ 
 
 
 /** Socket passed to CC by the SocketServer  */ 
 private Socket ccSocket; 
 
 /** The output stream use to push our messages onto the wire  */ 
 private PrintStream outPrintStream; 
 
 
 /** the location of the db, so we can call it's methods */ 
 private ClientDatabase db; 
 
 /** the keyname of the host that the CC relates to */ 
 private String keyname;  
 
 
 // CONSTRUCTOR 
 public ClientCommunicator(Socket passedSocket,  
   ClientDatabase db) { 
 
  this.ccSocket = passedSocket;  
 
  this.db = db; 
 
  //make the output stream.  input stream made in run() 
  try { 
 
   this.outPrintStream = new PrintStream(  
   ccSocket.getOutputStream() ); 
 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
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  } 
 
 








  /* (non-Javadoc) 
   * @see java.lang.Runnable#run() 
   */ 
  //@Override 
  public void run() { 
 
   ccListenerStarter() ; 
 
   outPrintStream.println("#GETNAME"); 
 








  /** 
   * Starts the ccListener. 
   * Use the ccListener for input from the MM-node. */ 
  private void ccListenerStarter(){ 
 
   try { 
 
    //spin off new ccListener 
 
Thread listenerThread = new Thread( 
new ClientCommunicatorListener( 
ccSocket.getInputStream(), db, this)); 
 





   } catch (IOException e) { 
 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
 
   } 
 
 









  /** 
   * Externally callable session terminator-closes socket.  
   * Also updates the status of the MM-Client in the db.   
   */ 
  public void terminateSession(){ 
 






   try { 
 
    ccSocket.close(); 
 






   } 
 
 





  /** 
   * Pushes any input string down to MM-Client 
   * @param msg 
   */ 
  public void sendMessage2Client(String msg){ 
 
   outPrintStream.println(msg); 
 




  /** 
   * @return the keyname 
   */ 
  public String getKeyname() { 
   return keyname; 





  /** 
   * @param keyname the keyname to set 
   */ 
  public void setKeyname(String keyname) { 
   this.keyname = keyname; 







APPENDIX D. MM-SERVER: CLIENTCOMMUNICATORLISTENER 
package commandserver; 
//Filename: ClientCommunicatorListener.java 






 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 * Handles input from MM-node.   
 * Parses MM-node messages and makes appropriate system calls. 
 * 
 */ 
public class ClientCommunicatorListener implements Runnable{ 
 
 /////////////////////////////////////////// 




 /** passed - will bolt on top a BufferedReader */ 
 private InputStream inStream; 
 
 /** use for reading incoming messages from MM-Client */ 
 private BufferedReader inBufferedReader;  
 
 /** gives ability to call ClientDatabase fns  */ 
 private ClientDatabase db; 
 
 /** gives ability to call back to the calling CC */ 











 public ClientCommunicatorListener(InputStream inputStream, 
   ClientDatabase db, ClientCommunicator callingCC) { 
 
  this.db = db ; 
 
  this.inStream = inputStream; 
 
  this.inBufferedReader =  
   new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inStream)); 
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 public void run() { 
 
  //Need try/catch to make severed sessions graceful 
  try { 
 
   listenLoop(); 
 
  } catch (NullPointerException e) { 
 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
 
  } 
 
  catch (Exception e) { 
 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
 
  } 
 
  finally { 
 
   System.out.println("Connection Lost to " +  
     parentCC.getKeyname()); 
 
   parentCC.terminateSession(); 
      db.getRecord(parentCC.getKeyname()).setClientStatus("LOST"); 
 
  } 
 
 









  * Main loop of CCListener. 
  * Blocks on readlines from MM-Client.  Calls appropriate db 
  * methods based on input passed up from MM-Client.   
  * @throws Exception  
  *  
  */ 
 private void listenLoop() throws Exception { 
 
  Boolean keepGoing = true; 
 
  String textReceived = ""; 
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  while ( keepGoing ) { 
 
   textReceived = inBufferedReader.readLine(); 
 
   if ( textReceived.compareTo("QUIT")==0 ){ 
 
    parentCC.terminateSession(); 
 
    keepGoing = false; 
 
   } 
 
   else if ( textReceived.contains("GETINBOX")){ 
 
    parentCC.sendMessage2Client(db.getRecord( 
      parentCC.getKeyname()).getClientInbox() ); 
 
   } 
 
 
   else if ( textReceived.contains("=") ){ 
 
    setVariableValue(textReceived); 
 
 
   }//end if 
 
   //RESET THE TEXT OR WE SPIN 
   textReceived = ""; 
 
 












  * Set a db key/value pair based on input from MM-client 
  *   
  * @param textReceived 
  */ 
 private void setVariableValue(String textReceived) { 
 
  int delimValue = textReceived.indexOf("=");  
 
  String key = textReceived.substring(0, delimValue); 
 




  if (key.compareTo("NAME")==0) { 
 
   parentCC.setKeyname(value); 
 
   db.createRecord(value, parentCC); 
 
  } 
 
  else if (key.compareTo("STATUS")==0) { 
 
   //with key, set the status 
   db.getRecord(parentCC.getKeyname()).setClientStatus(value); 
 
  } 
 
 
  else if (key.compareTo("EXERCISE")==0){ 
 
   db.getRecord(parentCC.getKeyname()).setExercise(value); 
 








APPENDIX E. MM-SERVER: CLIENTDATABASE.JAVA 
package commandserver; 
// Filename: ClientDatabase.java 








 * The database of ClientRecords. 
 * Uses a TreeMap (for now) as the data structure,  
 * and ClientRecords as the nodes.   
 *  
 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 * 
 */ 








 /**the database data structure of ClientRecord*/ 
 private SortedMap< String, ClientRecord > dbase = 
  Collections.synchronizedSortedMap(  
    new TreeMap< String, ClientRecord >() ); 
 
 /////////////////////////////////////////// 





  * Constructor for ClientDatabase 
  *  
  * */ 














  * Creates a record in the database.  
  * @param hostID - uid_host of the host we are creating (used as 
key) 
  * @param ccIn  - the calling Client Communicator 
  * @return True if successfully created 
  * */ 
 public Boolean createRecord(String hostID, ClientCommunicator ccIn){ 
  ClientRecord newRecord = new ClientRecord(ccIn, this);  
 
 
  try { 
 
    dbase.put(hostID, newRecord); 
 
    System.out.println("Added record for " + hostID); 
 
  } 
 
  catch (ClassCastException cce) { 
 
    System.err.println(cce); 
  } 
 
  catch (NullPointerException npe) { 
 
    System.err.println(npe); 
  }   
 













  * get a client record from the database. 
  * Pulls an instance of ClientRecord from the database, for use as  
  * a helper function for class functions.    
  * @param hostID - uid_host of the host of interest 
  * @return ClientRecord 
  *  
  * */ 
 public ClientRecord getRecord(String hostID) { 
  // gets the record from the TreeMap that has the hostID key 
  ClientRecord tempClientRecord = null; 
  try { 
   tempClientRecord = dbase.get(hostID); 
  } 
  catch (ClassCastException cce) { 
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    System.err.println(cce); 
  } 
  catch (NullPointerException npe) { 
    System.err.println(npe); 
  }  






  * Returns String of all database inbox and status for all MM-C. 
  * Typically used for console troubleshooting.  
  *  
  * @return returnString, a string of all db parameters by client 
  */ 
 public String getAllrecordsFromDB(){ 
 
  String returnString = ""; 
 
  for (String keyString : dbase.keySet() ) { 
 
   returnString += keyString + "," +  
    dbase.get(keyString).getUID_ExerciseNetwork() +"," + 
    dbase.get(keyString).getClientInbox() + "," + 
    dbase.get(keyString).getClientStatus() +"\n" ; 
 
  }//end for-loop 
 
 








  * deletes a client record from the database. 
  * Will attempt to remove a client record from the database,  
  * based on the host UID provided.    
  * @param hostID - uid_host of the host of interest 
  * @return True of record and deleted, False if record not found 
  *  
  * */ 
 public Boolean deleteRecord(String hostID) { 
 
  // tries to delete the record 
  Boolean deleteSuccess; 
 
  ClientRecord tempClientRecord = null; 
 
  try { 
 
   tempClientRecord = dbase.remove(hostID); 
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  } 
 
  catch (ClassCastException cce) { 
 
    System.err.println(cce); 
  } 
 
  catch (NullPointerException npe) { 
 
    System.err.println(npe); 
 
  }  
 
  if (tempClientRecord == null) 
 
   deleteSuccess = false; 
 
  else { 
 
   deleteSuccess = true;  
  } 
 











  * Halts running module - OVERLOADED METHOD.   
  * Called without arguments, halts running module in all  
  * modules.  Simple iteration over dbase, setting client  
  * inboxes to HALT.   
  */ 
 public void halt_module(){ 
 
  for (String keyString : dbase.keySet() ) { 
 
   dbase.get(keyString).setClientInbox( "HALT" ); 
 
  }//end for-loop 
 
 















  *  Starts running module - OVERLOADED METHOD.   
  * Called without target arguments, starts running module in all  
  * modules.  Simple iteration over dbase, setting client  
  * inboxes to MOD_X, where X is the module number.  
  *  
  * @param moduleNumber 
  */ 
 public void run_module(int moduleNumber){ 
 
  for (String keyString : dbase.keySet() ) { 
 
   dbase.get(keyString). 
    setClientInbox("MOD_" + moduleNumber); 
 
  }//end for-loop 
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APPENDIX F. MM-SERVER: CLIENTRECORD.JAVA 
package commandserver; 
// Filename: ClientRecord.java 
// 21 December, 2010 
 
/** 
 * ClientRecord - the records in the database. 
 * Includes all fields associated with a single client, except for  
 * it's uid, which the record is keyed by in the database.   
 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 * 
 */ 
public class ClientRecord { 
 
 /////////////////////////////////////////// 





 /**unique identifier of the exercise network */ 
 private String uid_ExerciseNetwork; 
 
 
 /**status of the client, set by the client, read by server */ 
 private String status; 
 
 
 /**inbox of the client, set by server, read by client */ 
 private String clientInbox; 
 
 /**where the ClientCommunicator lives */ 




























  * Constructor for a ClientRecord - called by ClientDatabase. 
  * Gets passed hostID, exerciseID and a socket.  Initializes 
  * the class with the passed params, and makes empty for those  
  * params that it does not yet have.   
  * @param hostID - uid_host of host we are creating (used as key) 
  * @param exerciseID - the UID of the exercise 
  * @param passedCC - the ClientCoummincator for the client. 
  * @param db - the database of clients 
  */ 
 public ClientRecord (ClientCommunicator passedCC, ClientDatabase 
db){ this.cc = passedCC; 
 
  this.uid_ExerciseNetwork = "NOT_SET"; 
 
  this.status = "INITIALIZED"; 
 












  * returns the content of the client's inbox 
  * The client inbox is set by the server, but read by 
  * the client.  Consists of a plain text string value.    
  * @return clientInbox - the contents of the client's inbox 
  */ 
 public String getClientInbox(){ 
 





 public ClientCommunicator getCC(){ 
 















  * for the commandServer to get status of the individual client 
  * @return status - the contents of the client's status box 
  */ 
 public String getClientStatus(){ 










  * return the UID of the exercise network 
  * @return uid_ExerciseNetwork 
  */ 
 public String getUID_ExerciseNetwork() { 














  * Allows server to write message to client inbox.  
  * Only servers shall write to the client inbox.   
  * @param hostID - uid_host of the host of interest 
  * @param message - String of message FROM server TO client.   
  * */ 
 public void setClientInbox(String message){ 
 













  * Allows client to set their status in status box of record.  
  * Only clients shall write their status to their status box.   
  * Read by the server to ascertain status of the client.   
  * @param message - String of status FROM client.   
  *  
  * */ 
 public void setClientStatus(String message){ 
 











  * Allows client to set exercise in exercise field of record.  
  * Only clients shall write their exercise to their exercise  
  * field.  Read by the server to ascertain exercise of the client.   
  * @param message - String of exercise FROM client.   
  *  
  * */ 
 public void setExercise(String message){ 
 





} // end of ClientRecord class 
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APPENDIX G. MM-CLIENT: CLIENTPROGRAM.JAVA 
/****************************************************************/ 
/*                                                              */ 
/*      Program:  Malware Mimic Client    */ 
/*                                                              */ 
/*      Handles client side communications.  Controls session   */ 
/*      with remote server.  Executes commands from server on   */ 
/*   local machine.                                         */ 
/*                                                             */ 
/*      FILE:       ClientProgram.java    */ 
/*                                                              */ 
/*      USAGE: ./MM-Client hostname exerciseId srvrName srvrPort*/ 
/*                                                              */ 
/*          hostname      name of host                          */ 
/*          serverName    IP addr of server, in dotted quad     */ 
/*          serverPort   Integer port number of remote server   */ 
/*                                                              */ 
/*   AUTHORS: W. Taff and P. Salevski                       */ 
/*                                                              */ 
/*   DATE: 22 January 2011    */ 
/*                                                              */ 







 * The MM-Client software for remote host. 
 * Handles both sides of  communication with the remote server 
 * (up and down) as well as local execution of remotely (server) 
 *  commanded methods.     
 *  
 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 * 
 */ 



















  * Top level main() for program.   
  * Loops, starting clientController with each iteration.  If 
  * clientController dies, handles that exception, and restarts. 
  * So far, is self perpetuating - i.e., will loop until killed  
  * externally.    
  *  
  * @param args hostName, exercise Id, server IP.addr, server port 
  */ 




  while (true) { 
 
   try { 
 
    new ClientController(args[0], args[1], args[2], Integer 
      .parseInt(args[3])).run(); 
 
   } catch (NumberFormatException e) { 
 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
 
    System.out.println("Check your parameters!\n" + 
      "Expect hostId exerciseID serverIP.addr " + 
      "serverIP.port" ); 
 
    System.exit(2); 
 
   }  
 
   catch (ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException e) { 
 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
 
    System.out.println("Check your parameters!\n" + 
      "Expect hostId exerciseID serverIP.addr " + 
      "serverIP.port" ); 
 
    System.exit(2); 
 
   } 
 
   catch (NullPointerException f) { 
 
    f.printStackTrace(); 
 
   } 
 
   catch (Exception e) { 
 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
 
   } 
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   finally { 
 
    try { 
 
     Thread.sleep(10000); 
 
    } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
 
     e.printStackTrace(); 
 
    } 
 
   } 
 
  }//end while 
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 * Controller class for the Malware Mimic client.   
 * Started by ClientProgram. IPC code based on code by 
 * John Yeary.   
 *  
 * @author W. Taff and P. Salevski 
 * 
 */ 





 //DATA MEMBERS  
 /////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 private String hostName; 
 
 private String os_name; 
 
 private String exerciseID ;  
 
 private Runtime localRuntime; 
 
 private String status; 
 
 private InetAddress localMachine; 
 
 private Socket socket; 
 
 private String textReceiveBuf; 
 
 private BufferedReader inBufferedReader; 
 
 private PrintStream outPrintStream; 
 
 private String serverAddr; 
 













  * Constructor for ClientController 
  * @param serverPort the port of the remote server to use 
  * @param serverAddr the string dotted-quad server address 
  * @param hostName the hostname of local machine; will append 
  * @param exerciseID  
  * @throws Exception  
  *  
  */ 
 
 public ClientController(String hostName, String exerciseID,  
   String serverAddr, int serverPort) throws Exception { 
 
  super(); 
 
  os_name  = System.getProperty("os.name"); 
 
  localRuntime = Runtime.getRuntime(); 
 
  status = "READY"; 
 
  localMachine = InetAddress.getLocalHost(); 
 
  socket = new Socket(serverAddr,serverPort); 
 
  this.hostName = hostName + localMachine.getHostName(); 
 
  this.serverAddr = serverAddr; 
 
  this.serverPort = serverPort; 
 








  * Main body of the clientController. 
  * Loops until receives a halt command, checking the inbox  
  * located on the remote server, and executing any commands.  
  *  
  * @throws Exception 
  */ 
 public void run() throws Exception { 
 
  initializeConnection(); 
 
   //and then start looping and keep checking inbox 
   while ( textReceiveBuf.compareTo("HALT")!=0 ){ 
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    outPrintStream.println("GETINBOX"); 
 
    Thread.sleep(5000); 
 
    textReceiveBuf = inBufferedReader.readLine(); 
 
    System.out.println(textReceiveBuf); 
 
 
    if ( textReceiveBuf.compareTo("MOD_0")==0 ) mod_0(); 
 
    if ( textReceiveBuf.compareTo("MOD_1")==0 ) mod_1(); 
 
    if ( textReceiveBuf.compareTo("MOD_2")==0 ) mod_2(); 
 
 
   }//end while 
 
 
   //CLOSE CONNECTION 
   outPrintStream.println("CLOSING..."); 
 
   Thread.sleep(1000); 
 
   socket.close(); 
 
 












  * Initializes the connection with the remote host. 
  * Called by run(), connects with the remote host, and upon 
  * connection, sends initialization parameters to the server. 
  *  
  * @throws Exception 
  */ 
 private void initializeConnection() throws Exception { 
 
  System.out.println("Connected ... waiting for #GETNAME") ; 
 
  outPrintStream = new PrintStream(socket.getOutputStream() ); 
 
  inBufferedReader = new BufferedReader( 
     new InputStreamReader(socket.getInputStream())); 
 
  //GIVE TIME FOR INITIAL COMMAND TO ARRIVE 
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  Thread.sleep(1000); 
 
 
  if (inBufferedReader.ready()) { 
 
   textReceiveBuf = inBufferedReader.readLine(); 
   System.out.println(textReceiveBuf); 
 
  } 
 
  //if server says getname, tell it 
 
  if (textReceiveBuf.compareTo("#GETNAME")==0 ){ 
 
   outPrintStream.println("NAME=" + hostName); 
   outPrintStream.println("STATUS=" + status);  
   outPrintStream.println("EXERCISE=" + exerciseID); 
 
  } 
 
 











  * A hping scan of 10 sequential ports from a random start port. 
  * Scans server in range of 1 to 1024.   
  * @throws InterruptedException 
  */ 
 private void mod_2() throws InterruptedException { 
 
  status=("MOD_2"); 
 
  outPrintStream.println("STATUS=" + status);  
 




  try { 
 
   Process p = null; 
 
   if (os_name.contains("Linux")) { 
 
     p = localRuntime.exec("/usr/bin/sudo " + 
       "/usr/sbin/hping3 -c 10 -s 1 -p "+  
       randomPort + " -S " + serverAddr); 
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     randomPort++; 
 
     System.out.println(randomPort); 
 
   } 
 
   else { //is windows 
 
 
     p = localRuntime.exec("hping -c 10 -s 1 -p " 
       + randomPort +" -S "+serverAddr); 
 
     System.out.println(randomPort); 
 
   } 
 
 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
 
  } 
 
  System.out.println("Mod 2 Iteration Complete"); 
 
 









  * A 5 ping module. 
  * Pings server 5 times then stops.   
  */ 
 private void mod_1() { 
 
  status = "MOD_1"; 
 
  outPrintStream.println("STATUS=" + status); 
 
 
  try { 
 
   Process p; 
 
   if (os_name.contains("Linux")) { 
 
    p = localRuntime.exec("/bin/ping -c5 " + serverAddr); 
 
   } 
 
   else { //is windows 
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    p = localRuntime.exec("ping -n 5 " + serverAddr); 
 
   } 
 
   BufferedReader buffRdr = new BufferedReader( 
     new InputStreamReader(new BufferedInputStream( 
       p.getInputStream()))); 
 
   String line; 
 
   while ((line = buffRdr.readLine()) != null) { 
 
    System.out.println(line); 
 
   } 
 
   try { 
    if (p.waitFor() != 0) { 
 
     System.err.println( 
       "exit value = " + p.exitValue()); 
    } 
   } 
   catch (InterruptedException e) { 
    System.err.println(e); 
   } 
 
 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
 
  } 
 
  System.out.println("Mod 1 Iteration Complete"); 
 
 




  * Sends a status update message to the server.   
  * Equivalent to an idle command.   
  *  
  */ 
 private void mod_0() { 
 
  status=("MOD_0"); 
 
  outPrintStream.println("STATUS=" + status);  
 
 } //end mod_0() 
 
 
}// end class 
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